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TRIPS AGREEMENT: TOWARDS A
BETTER PROTECTION FOR
GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS?
José Manuel Cortés Martín1
I. INTRODUCTION

G

eographical Indications (GIs) are intellectual property
rights.2 Like trademarks or commercial names, GIs are
distinctive signs which permit the identification of products on
the market. They do not, however, protect products or production methods as such, but, rather, confer to all producers from a
given geographical area the exclusive right to use a distinctive
sign to identify their products if they possess a given quality,
reputation, or other characteristic attributable to their geographical origins.3
Prior to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS or the TRIPS Agreement), source
indications with geographical significance comprised two categories: appellations of origin and indications of source. Appella1. Associate Professor of International Law at the Universidad Pablo de
Olavide in Sevilla (Spain). L.M. in European Community Law (Maitrîse en
Droit Européen), Institut d’Études Européens Fernand Dehousse, Université
de Liège (Belgium). Doctorate in Public International Law from the Universidad Pablo de Olavide. Visiting Professor at the Law School Texas Tech University during the summer of 2003.
2. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS – RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, art.
1.2, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS] (“For the purposes of this Agreement, the term ‘intellectual property’ refers to all categories of intellectual property that are the subject of Sections 1 through 7 of Part II.”). Section 3 of TRIPS
refers to Geographical Indications. TRIPS came into force in 1995, and had
effect in developed countries – including the United States – as of January 1,
1996. Developing countries, however, had until January 1, 2000 to comply with
the TRIPS standards with respect to GIs and the least-developed countries have
until January 1, 2006 to comply.
3. Historically, GIs have been given various definitions, but TRIPS defines them as, “indications which identify a good as originating in the territory
of a Member, or a region or locality in that territory, where a given quality,
reputation or other characteristic of the good is essentially attributable to its
geographical origin.” Id. art. 22.1.
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tions of origin signify not only the geographical region from
which products originate but also specific features of the products which result from the natural and human factors in their
particular locale.4 Indications of source merely state where the
product was made.5 The TRIPS Agreement created a single
category for such indications, GIs, which is broader than indications of source, but does not incorporate the natural and human
factors of appellations of origin.6 For purposes of this discussion, the TRIPS definition of GIs is the most relevant. GIs are
instruments designed to protect a product’s reputation7 and differ from patents and copyrights in that they are not specifically
designed to reward innovation.8 Rather, they reward producers
situated in a certain region who follow production practices and
customs associated with that region.9 GIs reward goodwill and
reputation created or built up by a group of producers over

4. See Daniel Hangard, Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications in France and in the European Union, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
ORGANIZATION (WIPO) SYMPOSIUM ON THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF
GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS: MELBOURNE, APRIL 5–6, 1995, 65, 67 (1995) [hereinafter Symposium 1995]; Lisbon Agreement for the Protection of Appellations
of Origin and their International Registration, Oct. 31, 1958, 923 U.N.T.S.
205, reprinted in 3 STEPHEN P. LADAS, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND RELATED
RIGHTS: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, 1954 (1975), available at
http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs/en/wo/wo012en.htm (last visited Aug. 25, 2004)
[hereinafter Lisbon Agreement].
5. See F. Addor & A. Grazzioli, Geographical Indications Beyond Wines
and Spirits – A Roadmap for a Better Protection for Geographical Indications
in the WTO TRIPS Agreement, 5 J. OF WORLD INTEL. PROP. 865, 867 (2002)
(defining an indication as, “any expression or sign used to indicate that a
product or a service originates in a country, region, or a specific place without
any element of quality or reputation”).
6. See TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 22.1 (“Geographical indicators are, for
purposes of this Agreement, indications which identify a good as originating
in the territory of a Member, or a region or locality in that territory, where a
given quality, reputation or other characteristic of the good is essentially attributable to its geographical origin.”).
7. See id. art. 22.2.
8. A patent for an invention is the grant of a property right to the inventor, issued by the Patent Office. Id. art. 27. A copyright is the legal right
granted to an artist, author, computer user, musician, playwright, publisher,
or distributor to exclusive publication, production, sale, or distribution of a
literary, musical, dramatic, or artistic work. Id. art. 9.
9. TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 22.1.
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many years and, in this sense, operate to maintain traditional
knowledge and practices.10
GIs benefit consumers by providing reliable information and
assurances of authenticity11 and, if used in a proper, wellprotected way, can become effective marketing tools of great
economic value.12 Indeed, GIs convey the cultural identity of
nations and regions and make it possible to add value to a country’s natural riches and to its population’s skills.13 In order for
these benefits to become a reality, it is necessary to protect GIs
at the international level.
Historically, GIs have received little international protection.
Before 1994, the protection of GIs in international fora was limited to three international instruments under the auspices of
the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO): the Paris
Convention;14 the Madrid Agreement;15 and the Lisbon Agreement.16 The Paris Convention is a widely-recognized international agreement, while the other two suffer from limited membership.17 It was during the Uruguay Round18 that trade in in10. An example of traditional knowledge is the Turmeric (Curcuma longa),
a plant in the ginger family yielding saffron-coloured rhizomes used as a spice
for flavouring Indian cooking. It also has properties that make it an effective
ingredient in medicines and cosmetics and as a color dye. As a medicine, it is
traditionally used to heal wounds and rashes. See Shubha Ghosh, Globalization, Patents, and Traditional Knowledge, 17 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 73, 93–94
(2003).
11. See Paul J. Heald, Trademarks and Geographical Indications: Exploring the Contours of the TRIPS Agreement, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 635, 655
(1996).
12. See Michael Maher, On Vino Veritas? Clarifying the Use of Geographic
References on American Wine Labels, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1881, 1885–86 (2001).
13. Lori E. Simon, Appellations of Origin: The Continuing Controversy, 5
NW. J. INT’L. L. & BUS. 132, 132 (1983).
14. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20,
1883, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305, available at http://www.wipo.
int/clea/docs/en/wo/wo020en.htm (last visited Aug. 25, 2004) [hereinafter Paris
Convention].
15. Madrid Agreement for the Repression of False and Deceptive Indications of Source, Apr. 14, 1891, 828 U.N.T.S. 168, available at http://www.
wipo.int/clea/docs/en/wo/wo032en.htm (last visited Aug. 25, 2004) [hereinafter
Madrid Agreement].
16. Lisbon Agreement, supra note 4.
17. As of September 24, 2004, only thirty-four States are members of the
Madrid Agreement. A list of those Members is published on the WIPO website, at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/documents/word/f-mdrd-o.doc (last
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tangibles was included, for the first time, in multilateral trade
negotiations, resulting in, among others, the TRIPS Agreement,
which technically is Annex C of the treaty that created the
World Trade Organization (WTO). TRIPS covers a broad range
of intellectual property rights19 and regulates the availability,
scope, and use of these intangible assets.20 The inclusion of GIs
caused heated debates during the Uruguay Round and continues to generate discussion between the new and old world.21
Like many aspects of the Uruguay Round negotiations, the disagreement among Members impeded the creation of a complete
system for the international protection of GIs.
Regrettably, compared to other intellectual property rights,
protection of GIs at the international level remains inadequate.
In addition to the legal uncertainty that TRIPS provisions continue to generate, many countries feel that the current level of
protection provided for GIs fails to prevent free-riding on the
reputation of genuine GIs.22 WTO Negotiators in the Uruguay
visited Oct. 19, 2004). As of October 4, 2004, only twenty-two States are members of the Lisbon Agreement. A list of the Members of the Lisbon Agreement
is published on the WIPO website, at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/
documents/pdf/j-lisbon.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2004).
18. The World Trade Organization is the outcome of a "negotiating" process – the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations – launched by
Ministers of GATT Members, who met at a Special Session of the GATT Contracting Parties at Punta del Este, Uruguay, in September 1986. The negotiations and process ended with the signing of the Final Act of the Marrakesh
Agreement in April 1994 at Marrakesh, Morocco.
19. See TRIPS, supra note 2 (the intellectual property rights covered by the
TRIPS Agreement are Copyright and Related Rights, Trademarks, Industrial
Designs, Patents, Layout-Designs (Topographies) of Integrated Circuits, Protection of Undisclosed Information, and Control of Anti-Competitive Practices
in Contractual Licenses).
20. See id. arts. 22, 63.
21. See Jorg Reinbothe & Anthony Howard, The State of Play in the Negotiations on TRIPS (GATT/Uruguay Round), 13 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 157,
161 (1991). On the one hand, some European countries, representing the old
world, have a long tradition of protecting this type of intellectual property.
On the other hand, the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand,
among others, representing the new world, have not historically had separate
laws to protect GIs, apart from their respective systems of trademarks.
22. See WTO Council for TRIPS, Communication from Bulgaria, Cuba,
Cyprus, the Czech Republic, the European Communities and their Member
States, Georgia, Hungary, Iceland, India, Kenya, Liechtenstein, Malta, Mauritius, Pakistan, Romania, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Sri Lanka, Switzer-
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Round were conscious of these deficiencies and, thus, mandated
ongoing negotiations to continue the commitment toward improving intellectual property rights.23 One of these areas is negotiations concerning the establishment of a multilateral system of GI notification and registration.24 These negotiations
began in 1995 and have yet to produce any real results. While
some countries are in favor of granting further GI protection,
others wish to maintain the status quo.
The purpose of this Article is, first, to describe how the WTO
strives to secure effective protection for GIs, and, second, to explore the prospects for further development based upon these
ongoing negotiations. In order to accomplish these objectives,
the Article must first review the international protection of GIs
prior to and under the TRIPS Agreement, followed by reviews
and critiques of the various proposals for a multilateral system
of registration set forth during negotiations. Next, the Article
considers the appropriateness of expanding the system to establish additional protection for products other than wines and
spirits. The Article then concludes by arguing in favor of further GI protection and for WTO Members to shoulder their responsibility by providing greater protection for GIs. Doing so
ensures that TRIPS remains an effective multinational treaty
and sets an example for compliance by other Members. This
compliance would be particularly helpful for developing countries which are becoming aware that products identified with
their country, or a given region within their country, can contribute mightily to their economic development.
II. INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS
PRIOR TO THE TRIPS AGREEMENT
As stated in Section I, prior to the TRIPS Agreement, the
Paris Convention,25 Madrid Agreement,26 and Lisbon Agreeland, Thailand and Turkey, IP/C/W/353 (June 24, 2002) (Doc #02-3484),
available at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple.
23. See TRIPS, supra note 2, arts. 23.4, 24.1, 24.2. See also Frederick M.
Abbott, TRIPS in Seattle: The Not-So-Surprising Failure and the Future of the
TRIPS Agenda, 18 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 165, 166 (2000) (citing negotiation for
GI protections as a “Built-In Agenda” item that remains before the TRIPS
Council).
24. See TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 23.4.
25. Paris Convention, supra note 14.
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ment27 were the only noteworthy international treaties which
provided GI protection. Unfortunately, the Paris Convention
suffered from vagueness in terms of GIs, while the Madrid and
Lisbon Agreements suffered from limited memberships.
A. The Paris Convention
Undoubtedly, the Paris Convention became the most important treaty adopted in the late nineteenth century because it
influenced intellectual property laws adopted by many countries throughout the twentieth century.28 This treaty was the
first multilateral agreement to provide protection for GIs, although it was rather general and weak when compared to the
protections afforded by the TRIPS Agreement.29
The Paris Convention’s large number of Member States
agreed mainly to border measures for false indications without
defining the conditions for protection.30 Under the Paris Con26. Madrid Agreement, supra note 15.
27. Lisbon Agreement, supra note 4.
28. The Paris Convention was agreed to in 1883 and was complemented by
the Madrid Protocol of 1891. It was further revised in Brussels (1900), Washington (1911), The Hague (1925), London (1934), Lisbon (1958), Stockholm
(1967), and amended in 1979. The Paris Convention, as of August 25, 2004,
had 168 signatory states. The complete list of signatory countries, as of July
15, 2004 is available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/documents/pdf/dparis.pdf (last visited Aug. 25, 2004). Up to the last decade, the history of the
Paris Convention has been the history of international harmonization of industrial property laws and procedures. The 1883 Paris Convention laid the
foundation for this movement. See Friedrich-Karl Beier, One Hundred Years
of International Cooperation – The Role of the Paris Convention in the Past,
Present and Future, 15 INT’L REV. OF INDUS. PROP. AND COPYRIGHT L. 1 (1984)
(stating that “[t]he Paris Convention became the basic instrument for the
protection of inventions, industrial designs trademarks and trade names, and
for the protection against unfair competition on a worldwide level”). Typical
for the time, the movement for extension and harmonization of the regimes for
the protection of industrial property had its origins in industrialized Europe.
The accession to the Convention by other countries shows how quickly the
ideals of the Convention spread eastward.
29. See generally JOSÉ MANUEL CORTÉS MARTÍN, LA PROTECCIÓN DE LAS
INDICACIONES GEOGRÁFICAS EN EL COMERCIO INTERNACIONAL E INTRACOMUNITARIO, 125–30 (2003).
30. See Albrecht Conrad, The Protection of Geographical Indications in the
TRIPS Agreement, 86 TRADEMARK REP. 11, 28 (1996) (stating that the Paris
Convention has more than a hundred members, but does not contain substantial provisions for the protection of GIs).
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vention, Members must seize or prohibit imports with false indications of source, producer, manufacturer, or merchant.31 In
its original form, Members acted only in cases of serious fraud.32
Article 10 of the Paris Convention mandates the seizure of
goods in cases of “direct or indirect use of a false indication of
the [source of the good or the] identity of the producer, manufacturer or merchant....”33 In 1958, Article 10bis(3) was added to
prohibit indications that were “liable to mislead the public as to
the nature, the manufacturing process, the characteristics, the
suitability for their purpose, or the quantity of the goods.”34
Significantly, the word “characteristics” replaced the phrase
“the origin.”35 This provision serves as the basis for protection
against misleading GIs. However, the Paris Convention fails to
provide any remedies in case of infringement of this provision.
B. The Madrid Agreement
The Madrid Agreement provides specific rules for the repression of false and deceptive indications of source, thus exceeding
the level of protection given to GIs by the Paris Convention.36
Members having signed this agreement agree mainly to implement border measures and prevent the dilution of GIs into generic terms.37
31. Paris Convention, supra note 14, arts. 9, 10.
32. See Louis C. Lenzen, Bacchus in the Hinterlands: A Study of Denominations of Origin in French and American Wine Labeling Laws, 58
TRADEMARK REP. 145, 184 (1968).
33. Paris Convention, supra note 14, art. 10.
34. Id. art. 10bis.
35. In the Lisbon Conference, the Austrian Delegation proposed to reform
Art. 10bis of the Paris Convention, including the word “origin,” so that GIs
were protected by this disposition. However, the firm opposition of the United
States prevented this reform. See STEPHEN P. LADAS, 3 PATENTS, TRADEMARKS
AND RELATED RIGHTS: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 1579 (1975).
36. Madrid Agreement, supra note 15, art. 1(1) (“All goods bearing a false
or deceptive indication by which one of the countries to which this Agreement
applies, or a place situated therein, is directly or indirectly indicated as being
the country or place of origin shall be seized on importation into any of the
said countries.”).
37. Over time, some product names on product labels have become generic
and are used regardless of place of origin. See Council Regulation on the Protection of Geographical Indication and Designations of Origin for Agricultural
Products and Foodstuffs (EEC) N. 2081/92 (July 14, 1992), art. 3, reprinted in
208 EUR. COMMUNITY OFFICIAL J. 1 (defining generic terms as “the name of an
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The Madrid Agreement was amended in 1934 by adding Article 3bis, which prohibits the use of false representations on the
product itself and in advertising or other forms of public announcements.38 In addition to providing more specific protection, the Madrid Agreement included controversial areas of protection, most significantly Article 4, which prohibits Members
from treating GIs of wines as generic terms.39 However, few
states signed the Madrid Agreement due largely to its expansive view of GI protection; several Paris Convention Members
preferred to enter into bilateral agreements with the purpose of
protecting GIs internationally.40 Due to its weak support, the
impact of the Madrid Agreement has been minimal.

agricultural product or a foodstuff which, although it relates to the place or
the region where this product or foodstuff was originally produced or marketed, has become the common name of an agricultural product or a foodstuff”), available at http://www.europa.eu.int.
38. Madrid Agreement, supra note 15, art. 3bis (“The countries to which
this Agreement applies also undertake to prohibit the use, in connection with
the sale or display or offering for sale of any goods, of all indications in the
nature of publicity capable of deceiving the public as to the source of the
goods, and appearing on signs, advertisements, invoices, wine lists, business
letters or papers, or any other commercial communication.”).
39. Id. art. 4.
40. Bilateral and plurilateral (including regional) agreements may also
serve the purpose of protecting GIs internationally. A number of countries
have already entered into these types of agreements. These agreements can
adopt the form of a specific treaty referring only to GIs by listing them, such
as the agreement adopted by Germany and France in 1960 for the protection
of indications of source, appellations of origin, and other geographical indications. This became the model for numerous bilateral agreements signed by
European countries. See Roland Knaak, The Protection of Geographical Indications According to the TRIPs Agreement, 18 IIC STUDIES, STUDIES IN
INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY AND COPYRIGHT LAW, FROM GATT TO TRIPS – THE
AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
117, 122–23 (Friedrich-Karl Beier & Gerhard Schricker eds., 1996) (discussing
bilateral agreements on indications of source). Regional and bilateral agreements in force which provide protection to GIs have been submitted to the
Council for TRIPS according to Article 4(d) of the TRIPS Agreement. See
WTO Council for TRIPS, Note by the Secretariat, Overview of Existing International Notification and Registration Systems for Geographical Indications
Relating to Products other than Wines and Spirits, IP/C/W/85/Add.1 (July 2,
1999) (Doc. # 99-2747), paras. 4–5, available at http://docsonline.
wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple.
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C. The Lisbon Agreement
The Lisbon Agreement was enacted in 1958 as an attempt to
achieve effective and enforceable protection for appellations of
origin.41 It provided for strict protection through an international registration system42 and was modeled after the registration system for trademarks devised under the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks.43
Signatories of the Lisbon Agreement were emphasizing that the
protection of appellations of origins should be as comprehensive
as those for trademarks. The main feature of the Lisbon Agreement is that appellations of origin are to be recognized and
protected as such, both in the country of origin and registered
at an agency of the WIPO.44 Article 1 states that once an
appellation of origin is registered, it is to be protected in other
Member countries.45 According to Article 3, the Members must
prohibit imitations under their respective domestic laws, including the use of terms as “like,” “type,” or “style,” which may
be used along with the indication.46 Article 6 provides that no
appellation of origin can be considered generic in any other
Member country, so long as it is protected in the country of origin.47 However, such strict protection would require a change of
national laws for many non-Member countries.48 Because of its
strict protection and lack of flexibility, the Lisbon Agreement
has few signatories.49

41. Lisbon Agreement, supra note 4.
42. Id. art. 5.
43. Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of
Marks, Apr. 14, 1891, 828 U.N.T.S. 389. This Agreement was revised in
Brussels (Dec. 14, 1900), Washington, D.C. (June 2, 1911), The Hague (Nov. 6,
1925), London (June 2, 1934), Nice (June 15, 1957), Stockholm (July 14, 1967),
and amended one final time (Sept. 28, 1979).
44. Lisbon Agreement, supra note 4, art. 5.
45. Id. art. 1.
46. Id. art. 3.
47. Id. art. 6.
48. Conrad, supra note 30, at 26 (citing this as one of various reasons more
countries did not sign onto the Agreement).
49. Id. at 23 (noting that despite a high standard of protection for GIs, the
Lisbon Agreement was one of the models used for drafting the TRIPS provisions).
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III. PROTECTION OF GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS UNDER THE
TRIPS AGREEMENT
A. GIs Continue to Be a Source of Controversy in TRIPS
Negotiations
The treaties signed under the WIPO incur similar difficulties:
either the scope of protection remains undefined and effective
protection depends upon the good will of each Member country,
or the agreement requires a standard of uniformity that is simply non-existent. The three previously-mentioned agreements
exemplify how difficult it has been to strike a balance on the
appropriate level of GI protection which would find support by a
broad consensus of the international community. Nevertheless,
these agreements set the stage for the more successful TRIPS
Agreement. The Uruguay Rounds of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT)50 provided the opportunity to include
GIs in an international agreement that would guarantee protection. TRIPS is a monumental step forward in the area of GIs in
that, with more than 147 signatories, it is the first widelyaccepted international treaty in which all signatories are bound
to protect GIs through substantive provisions and to enforce its
application according to minimum standards.51 It also provides
for a strong dispute settlement mechanism under the WTO.52
Additionally, TRIPS provides for periodic review53 and renegotiations aimed at increasing GI protection.54

50. GATT was first signed in 1947. Wesley A. Cann, Jr., Creating Standards and Accountability for the Use of the WTO Security Exception: Reducing
the Role of Power-Based Relations and Establishing a New Balance Between
Sovereignty and Multilaterialism, 26 YALE J. INT’L L. 413, 414 (2001). The
agreement was designed to provide an international forum that encouraged
free trade between member states by regulating and reducing tariffs on
traded goods and by providing a common mechanism for resolving trade disputes. Id. at 418.
51. See TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 1 (“Members shall give effect to the provisions of this Agreement. Members may, but shall not be obligated to, implement in their domestic law more extensive protections than is required by
this Agreement, provided that such protection does not contravene the provisions of this Agreement.”).
52. Id. art. 64.
53. Id. art. 71.
54. Id. art. 23.
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One of the features of the TRIPS Agreement at the time of its
adoption was that not all categories of intellectual property
rights regulated therein had the same degree of legal or doctrinal development nor the same degree of acceptance among
countries.55 In the case of GIs, the appropriate legal treatment
and level of protection continued to be fiercely debated between
WTO Members.56 The debate over GI protection did not follow
the usual North-South divide;57 instead, the dispute creates a
dichotomy of states, with “emigrant” nations on one side and
“immigrant” nations on the other.58 The “emigrant nations” –
55. As previously discussed, prior to the TRIPS Agreement some international treaties, such as the Paris Convention, the Madrid Agreement, and the
Lisbon Agreement, contained provisions on the protection of indications of
source and appellations of origin. Even though they contained strong provisions for the protection of appellations of origin, their practical results were
meager. This is because the Paris Convention included only a general provision on this matter, and because the Madrid and Lisbon Agreements had limited membership. See discussion, supra Parts II.A–C.
56. See Reinbothe & Howard, supra note 21, at 158; see also Leigh Ann
Lindquist, Champagne or Champagne? An Examination of U.S. Failure to
Comply with the Geographical Provisions of the TRIPs Agreement, 27 GA. J.
INT’L & COMP. L., 309, 311–12 (1999) (“The inclusion of these [protections of
geographical indications of source] caused heated debates during the Uruguay
GATT Rounds and continues to generate discussion. The article that causes
most debate is Article 23 which deals with the protection of [GIs] for wines
and spirits.”).
57. Traditionally, developed and developing countries have tended to be in
opposite groups in the GATT-WTO system. With some limited exceptions,
this trend of opposition in North-South politics continues today. Developing
countries have organized themselves into alliances such as the African Group
and the Least-Developed Countries Group. But, in other issues, the developing countries do not share common interests and may find themselves on opposite sides of a negotiation. A number of different coalitions among different
groups of developing countries have emerged for this reason. The differences
can be found in subjects of immense importance to developing countries, such
as agriculture. See WTO, Understanding the WTO: Developing Countries.
Some Issues Raised, at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/
dev4_e.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2004).
58. “Emigrant” countries include those in Europe, Africa and parts of Asia,
whereas “immigrant” countries include the United States, Australia, and
Latin American countries. Especially for European countries, GIs have a long
and proud tradition. Since antiquity, their existence has served to distinguish
products and to indicate source, serving a similar function to that of presentday trademarks. See Dr. A. Grigoriev, Opening Remarks, Symposium on the
International Protection of Geographical Indications, Nov. 9–10, 1989, cited in
M.G. Coerper, The Protection of Geographical Indications in the United States
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the European Union, Switzerland and former Eastern bloc
countries and a selection of developing nations – support extensive GI protection, while countries like Australia, New Zealand
and the United States ally with Latin American nations and
other “immigrant” nations to oppose GI protection.59
During negotiations, GI protection was a very sensitive issue.
Only at the very end of the Uruguay Round was an agreement
concerning GIs reached, and this was largely due to the parties’
ability to link GIs with the agricultural negotiations taking
place at the time. Although the issue of intellectual property
was included in the Uruguay Round at the very beginning,60
early proposals were initially tabled by negotiators. In effect,
the first texts presented during the Uruguay Round negotiations came to light almost a year after the Montreal Midterm
Review of the negotiation process in 1988.61
B. Protection Granted to Geographical Indications under
Section 3 of the TRIPS Agreement
According to the TRIPS Agreement, GIs are subject to the
same general principles applicable to all categories of intellecof America, with Particular Reference to Certification Marks, 29 INDUS. PROP.
232, n.1 (1990).
59. See Addor & Grazzioli, supra note 5, at 883 (affirming that the suitable
protection of GIs has never been a conflict of interests between developed and
developing countries, but between the countries of the old world and the new
world); see also Reinbothe & Howard, supra note 21, at 158.
60. The United States and Japan submitted proposals to the Uruguay
Round’s Preparatory Committee covering all intellectual property rights and
their enforcement. This led to long negotiations in an attempt to reconcile
differing proposals, but they ultimately failed to reach consensus. Ultimately,
co-chairs Switzerland and Colombia tried to reconcile all the proposals sent to
the Preparatory Committee. The Swiss-Columbian majority text served as
the basis for the Ministerial Conference and in its list of “subjects for negotiations,” Ministers included the item “trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights, including trade in counterfeit goods.” DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS
AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 10–11 (2d ed. 2003).
61. The proposals were presented by the European Communities, the
United States, Switzerland, Japan, and a group of developing countries consisting of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Egypt, India, Nigeria, Peru, Tanzania, and Uruguay. See, e.g., WTO Negotiating Group on
TRIPS, Draft Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, presented by the European Communities, MTN.GNG/NG11/W/68
(Mar. 29, 1990) (Doc #90-0178), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/
gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple.
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tual property rights included in the Agreement, primarily the
“minimum standards,”62 the “national treatment,”63 and the
“most-favored-nation clause.”64 Apart from these, Section 3 of
the TRIPS Agreement regulates the availability, scope, and use
of these intangible assets.65
The structure of Section 3 is quite simple and clear. First,
Article 22 provides general protection for all GIs.66 In this respect, WTO Members should provide legal tools so that interested parties can prevent the designation or presentation of a
good that indicates that the good originates in a geographical
area other than the true place of origin. They can also prevent
62. TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 1 (“Members shall give effect to the provisions of this Agreement. Members may, but shall not be obligated to implement in their domestic law more extensive protection than is required by this
Agreement.”).
63. See id. art. 3 (“Each Member shall accord to the nationals of other
Members treatment no less favorable than that it accords to its own nationals
with regard to the protection ….”). See generally Gail E. Evans, The Principle
of National Treatment and the International Protection of Industrial Property,
18 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 149, 160 (1996).
64. See TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 4 (“With regard to the protection of intellectual property, any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by a
Member to the nationals of any other country shall be accorded immediately
and unconditionally to the nationals of all other Members….”). See generally
Wolfgang Fikentscher, TRIPS and the Most Favored Nation Clause, in
CURRENT ISSUES IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 137–45 (J. Straus ed., 1995).
65. Both the Paris Convention and the Lisbon Agreement had a clear influence on the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement in general, but particularly
in the case of GIs. Substantive provisions contained in Articles 1 to 12 and 19
of the Paris Convention (1967) were “incorporated” in the TRIPS Agreement
with respect to the minimum standards concerning: the availability, scope,
and use of intellectual property; the enforcement of the intellectual property
rights; and, the acquisition and maintenance of intellectual property rights
and related inter partes procedures. This has had at least three important
consequences: (i) Members of the WTO are to comply with the substantive
provisions of the Paris Convention, mainly Articles 1 through 12 and Article
19, even if they were not signatories of that Convention; (ii) all WTO Members
are bound by the same Act of the Paris Convention (Stockholm Act of 1967);
and (iii) the provisions of the Paris Convention incorporated in the TRIPS
Agreement became subject to the WTO dispute settlement mechanism.
66. TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 22. Among the protections, Article 22.2 requires Members to provide the legal means for interested parties to prevent
the use of any means in the designation or presentation of a good that indicates or suggests that the good in question originates in a geographical area
other than the true place of origin in a manner which misleads the public as to
the geographical origin. Id.
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any use which constitutes an act of unfair competition within
the meaning of Article 10bis of the Paris Convention.67
Another important element of Article 22 is that inconsistent
use of a GI which does not mislead the public as to its true origin should not be considered an infringement of TRIPS.68 Additionally, Article 22 mandates that Members should refuse or
invalidate the registration of a trademark which contains or
consists of a GI, but only if such use of the trademark would be
misleading.69 Moreover, there is no obligation to protect GIs
which are unprotected in their country of origin or have fallen
into disuse in that country.70 Thus, protection abroad is dependent on continuing domestic protection.
In addition to the general protection contained in Article 22,
Article 23 accords additional protection for wines and spirits.71
This additional protection encompasses three main elements.
First, it provides the legal means for interested parties to prevent the use of GIs which erroneously identify wine and spirits
not originating in the place indicated by the GI.72 Second, it
mandates the refusal or invalidation of the registration of a
trademark for wines or spirits which contains or consists of a GI
at the request of an interested party.73 Third, it calls on Mem-

67. See id. Article 10bis of the Paris Convention was amended to prohibit
indications that were “liable to mislead the public as to the nature, the manufacturing process, the characteristics, the suitability for their purpose, or the
quantity of the goods.” Paris Convention, supra note 14, art. 10bis.
68. Misleading the public consists of any “act or practice, in the course of
industrial or commercial activities, that misleads, or is likely to mislead, the
public with respect to an enterprise or its activities, in particular, the products
or services offered by such enterprise, shall constitute an act of unfair competition.” See WIPO, Model Provisions on Protection Against Unfair Competition, art. 4, Geneva, 1996. Also, according to Article 22(b), whether the use of
a GI constitutes an act of unfair competition is governed exclusively by Article
10bis of the Paris Convention.
69. TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 22.
70. Id. art. 24.9.
71. Id. art. 23.
72. This is so even where the true origin of the goods is indicated or the
geographical indication is used in translation or accompanied by expressions
such as “kind,” “type,” “style,” “imitation,” or the like.
73. TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 23.2 (“The registration of a trademark for
wines which contains or consists of a geographical indication identifying wines
or for spirits which contains or consists of a geographical indication identifying spirits shall be refused or invalidated, ex officio if a Member’s legislation
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bers to negotiate for increased protections.74 These provisions
give GIs for wines and spirits stronger protection than those
provided in Article 22 for other products.
Lastly, Section 3 of TRIPS establishes a series of exemptions
to GI protection in an endeavor to accommodate past registration and use.75 The first of these exemptions provides that nothing in Section 3 prevents a Member from continuing to use another Member’s GI if it has used it continuously in the past with
regard to the same goods or services.76 Article 24.5 provides the
second exemption allowing for continued use of previously acquired trademarks.77 The third exception refers to generic
terms and allows a country not to protect a GI if the relevant
indication is identical to common names of such goods or services.78
C. Negotiation and Review of TRIPS Section on Geographical
Indications
Proposals by the European Community (EC), the United
States, and Switzerland were indispensable to framing eventual
obligations concerning GIs. For example, key elements like Article 23’s “additional protection” for wines and spirits and for a
multilateral register for indications of wines and spirits were
so permits or at the request of an interested party, with respect to such wines
or spirits not having this origin.”).
74. Id. art. 24.1 (“Members agree to enter into negotiations aimed at increasing the protection of individual [GIs] under Article 23.”). It must be
noted that this third protection actually lies in Article 24 and not in Article
23, which deals exclusively with wines and spirits. Some countries are of the
opinion that this obligation applies to all geographical indications, and not
only to those concerning wine and spirits. This topic is explored in further
detail, infra, Part V.B.
75. See id. art. 24.
76. Id. art. 24.4 (either, (a) for at least 10 years preceding April 15, 1994
or, (b) in good faith preceding that date).
77. Id. art. 24.5. Article 24.5 provides that when a trademark has been
acquired or registered in good faith before the date of application of the
Agreement to that Member or before the GI was protected in its country of
origin, measures adopted to implement Section 3 shall not prejudice eligibility
for or the validity of the registration of a trademark or the right to use a
trademark on the basis that such trademark is identical with, or similar to, a
geographical indication.
78. Id. art. 24.6. Also, the right to use a personal name is not to be prejudiced under Section 3 of the Agreement. Id.
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present in the EC Proposal. The eventual framework reflects “a
very sensitive compromise in an area that was one of the most
difficult to negotiate.”79 WTO negotiators did not resolve all the
issues that were on the table, but instead agreed to include
within the TRIPS Agreement a “Built-In Agenda” for future
negotiations that was designed to facilitate continued negotiations toward international protection of this legal category.
IV. NEGOTIATIONS FOR A MULTILATERAL SYSTEM OF
REGISTRATION
A. Terms of Reference in Article 23.4: Facilitate; Voluntariness;
Registration and its Legal Effects; Wines and Spirits
Under the TRIPS system, WTO Members must open negotiations in the TRIPS Council to establish a multilateral notification and registration system for GIs.80 The precise terms of this
obligation are in Article 23.4, which states that “[i]n order to
facilitate the protection of geographical indications for wines,
negotiations shall be undertaken in the Council for TRIPS concerning the establishment of a multilateral geographical system
of notification and registration of geographical indications for
wines eligible for protection in those Members participating in
the system.”81
79. Matthijs C. Geuze, Protection of Geographical Indications Under the
TRIPS Agreement and Related Work of the World Trade Organization, in
SYMPOSIUM ON THE PROTECTION OF GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS IN THE
WORLDWIDE CONTEXT, OCT. 24–25, 1997, 41 (1999) [hereinafter Symposium
1997].
80. See TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 68.
81. This article was introduced in TRIPS at the request of the European
Community, although this Proposal contemplated coverage applicable to all
GIs and not only to those of the wine sector. WTO Negotiating Group on
TRIPS, Draft Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, presented by the European Community, MTN.GNG/NG11/W/68, art.
21(3) (Mar. 29, 1990) (Doc #90-0178), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/
gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple (“In order to facilitate the protection of
geographical indications including appellations of origin, the establishment of
an international register for protected indications should be provided for. In
appropriate cases the use of documents certifying the right to use the relevant
geographical indication should be provided for.”). The Proposal was included
in the text that the President of the Negotiations Group presented in July
1990. See WTO Negotiating Group on TRIPS, Status of Work in the Negotiating Group, Chairman’s Report to the GNG, MTN.GNG/NG11/W/76 (July 23,
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1. Facilitate
As the plain language of the provision suggests, the objective
of the creation of a register is to facilitate GI protections, thus
providing the necessary means to identify and make public, in a
transparent way, those GIs that Members should already protect. Identification is required because, when compared with
other intellectual property rights, such as patents and trademarks, GIs are often difficult to recognize.82 TRIPS unquestionably constitutes a dramatic step forward in protecting wine
and spirit GIs and, as such, the term “to facilitate” used in this
provision must be understood to identify GIs that Members are
already bound to protect, not via future multilateral registration but, rather, by present provisions of Part II, Section 3.
Article 23.4, along with the general definition of GIs in Article 22.1, implies that the register is only for GIs which fulfill
criteria established in the TRIPS Agreement. Specifically, the
provision suggests that only those that identify a good as originating in the territory of a Member will be able to accede to the
multilateral register.

1990) (Doc #90-0444). During the autumn of that year, some countries were
in favor of the creation of this register in the Uruguay Round and they even
presented, in an informal way, some proposals which contemplated, in a detailed and systematic way, the creation of this register. These Proposals were
debated by the Negotiations Group. However, other countries were committed
solely to examining this question in the future. This disagreement was reflected in the project presented by the President of the Negotiations Group to
the Ministerial Meeting of Brussels in December, 1990. See WTO Trade Negotiations Committee, Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations – Part 1 – Revision, MTN.TNC/
W/35-1/Rev.1 (Dec. 3, 1990) (“In order to facilitate the protection of geographical
indications, the Committee shall [examine the establishment of] a multilateral
system of notification and registration of geographical indication eligible for protection in the PARTIES participating in the system.”). Finally, the Negotiations Group decided to establish a commitment of future works exclusively
applicable to GIs of the wine sector, as reflected in the final text of Article
23.4. TRIPS, supra note 2, at art. 23.4.
82. See Conrad, supra note 30, at 12. One of the many problems related to
recognition involves defining boundaries. As Conrad suggests, “one of the
notorious problems involved in the protection of geographical names arises
from the fact that in most cases they do not identify a single business source
and therefore it is often difficult to establish the boundaries of the region that
can legitimately claim use of the name.” Id. The other problem with GI identification involves genericness. See id.

File: Martin Macro 122704.doc

134

Created on: 12/27/2004 1:35 PM

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

Last Printed: 12/27/2004 1:36 PM

[Vol. 30:1

2. Voluntariness
An ideal system would require all WTO Members to participate. However, a literal reading of Article 23.4 only establishes
a voluntary participatory system.83 This raises the issue of
whether a system based on voluntary participation could bind
WTO Members once a GI has been registered. The logical answer seems to be that a voluntary system could only bind participating Members. However, for reasons of transparency and
efficiency it is preferable that all WTO Members be subjected to
such registering, since a system whereby GIs are recognized
and protected in some Member territories but not others surely
creates legal and economic uncertainty, thus undermining the
objective of the protection. Indeed, Article 23.4 calls for the establishment of a multilateral system of notification and registration of GIs, and a multilateral system can only be understood
as requiring all parties to the WTO Agreement to be bound to
protect registered GIs. Unlike plurilateral trade agreements,
which bind only signatories, a multilateral system must be understood to include all WTO Members.84 Therefore, in the lexicon of the WTO, “plurilateral” must be understood as referring
to a system in which participation is entirely voluntary,
whereas “multilateral” is understood to bind all Members.85
83. See TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 23.4. Indeed, this position is supported
by its wording: “…eligible for protection in those Members participating in the
system.” Id.
84. The Agreement establishing the WTO expressly affirms that although
the four Plurilateral Trade Agreements (Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft; Agreement on Government Procurement; International Dairy Agreement and the International Bovine Meat Agreement) are part of the WTO
Agreement, they create neither obligations nor rights for Members that have
not accepted them. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS –
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1 (1994), art II.3, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1144
[hereinafter WTO Agreement].
85. WTO Council for TRIPS, Special Session, Minutes of Meeting,
TN/IP/M/4 (Feb. 6, 2003) (Doc #03-0786), para. 21, available at http://docs
online.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple. The representative of the
European Communities stated that “a multilateral system was a system that
somehow should concern all Members.” Id. Where systems and treaties in
other areas of the WTO did not concern all WTO Members, they were termed
“plurilateral,” such as the Agreement on Government Procurement. Id. In his
delegation's view, “that was not just a purely theoretical interpretation.” In
the same sense, the representative of Switzerland stated,
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Certainly, the phrase “Members participating in the system”
at the end of Article 23.4 seems to refer to voluntary participation. But, in my opinion, this reference can be interpreted as
meaning no more than those Members who chose to participate
by registering their GIs in the system. Under this interpretation, a participating Member would still be obligated to afford
protection to GIs registered by other Members, even though it
chooses not to register its own GIs. Nonetheless, the protection
of registered GIs must be obligatory for all by virtue not only of
the mandate of Article 23.4, but also via the other provisions of
Part II, Section 3, particularly Article 24.1.86 This provisional

The meaning of the term “multilateral” could only be determined by
comparing it with the term “plurilateral.” In the WTO context, while
“plurilateral” was understood to refer to a system in which participation was fully voluntary, for instance, the Agreement on Government
Procurement, “multilateral systems” were instruments which bound
all WTO Members.
Id. para. 28.
86. From a general perspective, it must be recalled that the WTO Agreement has eliminated the imbalances caused by the collateral agreements, also
referred to as “Codes,” concluded after the Tokyo Round (1973–1979), which,
in most cases, differentiated the norms and procedures for decision-making
and dispute resolution and whose acceptance among the Contracting Parties
was limited. However, some free-rider countries, countries which have assumed only the minimum level of obligations have tried to benefit from the
Most Favored Nation (MFN) clause of Article I of GATT. These countries
demanded the advantages resulting from these Codes, which they themselves
have ignored. To avoid these imbalances, Article II.3 of the WTO Agreement
states specifically that the MFN Clause is not applied to the four Plurilateral
Agreements. See LUIS NORBERTO GONZÁLEZ ALONSO, POLÍTICA COMERCIAL Y
RELACIONES EXTERIORES DE LA UNIÓN EUROPEA, 159 (1998). It must be observed,
however, that nothing equal has been established in the section of the TRIPS
Agreement relative to GI protection. Therefore, if we admitted that the multilateral register of GIs only must bind participant countries, nothing in it
would prevent the other WTO Members from demanding the application of
the MFN Clause established specifically in TRIPS, Article 4. Fikentscher,
supra note 64, at 141. In the case of particular collateral agreements concluded within the framework of Section 3, Part II of TRIPS, the MFN Clause
cannot apply because Article 24 urges the conclusion of bilateral or plurilateral agreements, thus revoking, in these specific cases, the benefits of this
fundamental principle of the WTO system. However, from my point of view,
this interpretation need not be accepted. Consider that a preliminary version
of the TRIPS Agreement specifically established the following exemption to
the MFN Clause for bilateral or multilateral agreements about GI protection:
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intersection results in a system of obligatory GI protection for
all because it prohibits any country from refusing to negotiate
to improve the protection of individual GIs.87 Thus, the notification of a GI to the register is equivalent to a request to open
negotiations.
3. Registration and Its Legal Effects
There remains the question of how “registration” in Article
23.4 should be understood.88 One view is that registration refers to a specific way of implementing TRIPS requirements that
differs from the common law approach based on case law.89
Registration in the field of intellectual property is normally understood as involving the grant of a title of protection with a
genuine legal effect.90 Under a system where registration has

PARTIES agree that the preceding paragraphs shall not prevent the
conclusion pursuant to Article 19 of the Paris Convention (1967) of bilateral or multilateral agreements concerning the rights under those
paragraphs, with a view to increasing the protection for specific geographical or other indications, and further agree that any advantage,
favor, privilege or immunity deriving from such agreements are exempted from the obligations under point 7 of Part II of this agreement.
WTO Negotiating Group on TRIPS, Status of Work in the Negotiating Group,
Chairman’s Report to the GNG, MTN.GNG/NG11/W/76 (July 23, 1990) (Doc
#90-0444), para. 4.2. However, this provision was not ultimately retained in
the final wording of the Agreement, which leads to the conclusion that this
principle would be applied totally to bilateral agreements relative to GIs protection.
87. TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 24.1 (“Members agree to enter into negotiations aimed at increasing the protection of individual [GIs] under Article
23….”).
88. See generally WTO, WTO News: 1998 News Items, TRIPS Council,
Discussion Develops on Geographical Indication, Dec. 2, 1998, at http://
www.wto.org/english/news_e/news98_e/pu_e.htm (discussing proposal for
registration system).
89. See generally WTO Council for TRIPS, Communication from the European Communities and their Member States, Proposal for a Multilateral Register of Geographical Indications for Wines and Spirits Based on Article 23.4 of
the TRIPS Agreement, IP/C/W/107 (July 28, 1998) (Doc #98-2930), available
at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple.
90. The creation of legal effects upon registration is perhaps best highlighted by the Madrid Agreement. Under the system created by the Madrid
Agreement, the effect of an international application is to require each of the
designated contracting parties to protect the subject matter in accordance
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no legal effect, the act of registration would not add value to
that of notification and therefore would not comport with Article 23.4.91 To give it such enhanced value, registration should
follow a phase of examination which would give it greater legitimacy.92
As with other titles of intellectual property, registration must
confer a presumption of legality. The legal implications of this
interpretation based upon Article 23.4 would be a presumption
of eligibility for protection in the markets of all WTO Members
for all GIs inscribed into the multilateral register. Equally important, the registration system must provide a forum for dispute resolution where Members can challenge the presumption
of validity and its legal effects for those GIs which are alleged to
lack the requirements mandated under TRIPS. In effect, Article 23.4 implies that the future system of notification and registration need not affect the TRIPS Agreement’s rights and obligations. Instead, the register functions to assist in facilitating
the protections arising from the TRIPS Agreement by means of
developing more transparent and efficient procedures. In this
sense, the register does not increase obligations nor diminish
acquired rights.
The alternative view focuses on the text of Article 1, which
states, “Members shall be free to determine the appropriate
method of implementing the provisions of this Agreement
within their own legal system and practice.”93 Thus, the regiswith national or regional law, unless it has lodged a refusal to protect within a
certain period. The system provides for the grant of an international title of
protection, which provides protection in each contracting party as if a national
title had been granted in that jurisdiction. However, the office of each designated contracting party can refuse to grant the protection. In the case of refusal, the holder of the international registration or deposit has the same
remedies as if the trademark or industrial design had been deposited by him
directly with the refusing office. See Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks, supra note 43.
91. WTO Council for TRIPS, Special Session, Minutes of Meeting, (Aug. 26,
2002) (Doc. #02-4570), para. 108 (arguing, from the Hungarian representative’s comments, that registration must carry with it legal effect), available
at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple [hereinafter
Minutes of June 28, 2002 Meeting].
92. Id. para. 110 (quoting the Switzerland representative, as arguing that
the “provisions of an examination and a challenge procedure gave legitimacy
to the listing in the multilateral register.”).
93. TRIPS, supra note 2, art 1.
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tration system need not supplant national systems of GI protection. In this sense, it continues to be the prerogative of Members to choose the legal means that best responds to their interests.
4. Wines and Spirits
Article 23.4 next addresses GIs for wine exclusively. However, the Ministerial Conference of Singapore of 1996 also included in the scope of its application the provision of spirits, as
evidenced by the Ministerial Declaration of the Report of Council TRIPS of 1996, in which Section 34 affirmed the following:
In regard to GIs ... the Council will initiate ... preliminary
work on issues relevant to the negotiations specified in Article
23.4 of the TRIPS Agreement ... Issues relevant to the notification and registration system for spirits will be part of this preliminary work. All of the above work would be conducted without prejudice to the rights and obligations of Members under
94
the TRIPS Agreement....

Ministers did not distinguish between wines and spirits despite their competence to do so. Against this background, spirits were included in the Council’s work; any other course of action would have been contradictory to the Ministerial Conference decision. Nevertheless, some Members continued to fight
against this extension, alleging that the Singapore Ministerial
Declaration only included “spirits” in the scope of preliminary
work to be carried out under Article 23.4.95 For these Members,
the pronouncement in Paragraph 18 of the Doha Ministerial
Declaration to the TRIPS Council to "complet[e] the work
started ... on the implementation of Article 23.4….”96 confirms
the intention of the Minister that, with the exception of GIs for
spirits, the multilateral system be established in accordance

94. WTO Council for TRIPS, Report (1996) of the Council for TRIPS, IP/C/8
(Nov. 6, 1996) (Doc. # 96-4704), para. 34, available at http://docsonline.wto.
org/gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple [hereinafter Report (1996) of the
Council for TRIPS].
95. Id.
96. WTO Ministerial Conference, Fourth Session, Ministerial Declaration,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 (Nov. 20, 2001) (Doc. #01-5859), available at http://docs
online.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple [hereinafter Doha Ministerial Declaration].
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97
with the mandate provided in Article 23.4. Those Members
believe that spirits should be included in the “preliminary
work” of the Council, but that they did not fall within the scope
of “negotiations” which were envisaged only for wines.98 As a
result, those Members believe that references to spirits should
be understood as relating to such work without the inference of
negotiations.99
The Doha Ministerial Conference attempted to clarify doubts
about the coverage of the multilateral register. In the Declaration passed at the Conference, the Ministers affirmed the convenience of negotiating the establishment of a multilateral system of notification and registration of GIs for wines and spirits.100 Nevertheless, WTO Members have different interpreta-

97. Minutes of June 28, 2002 Meeting, supra note 91, para. 18; WTO Council for TRIPS, Communication from New Zealand, New Zealand’s System of
Protection for Geographical Indications and the Multilateral Notification and
Registration System for Geographical Indications Under Article 23.4 of the
TRIPS Agreement, IP/C/W/189 (June 22, 2000) (Doc #00-2534), n.1, available
at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple.
98. To reflect the current limitation of the mandate established in Article
23.4 of TRIPS to wines, these WTO Members affirm that the term “and spirits” should appear in brackets in all the Proposals. See Minutes of June 28,
2002 Meeting, supra note 91, para. 18. However, the Chairperson, during the
debates, said that Members have a very clear mandate to negotiate the establishment of a multilateral system of notification and registration of GIs for
wines and spirits by the Fifth Session of the Ministerial Conference. He
added that a Special Session is required to fulfill the mandate in its entirety
and not to go beyond the mandate. Id. at paras. 20, 137; WTO Council for
TRIPS, Special Session, Minutes of Meeting, TN/IP/M/5, para. 31 (Apr. 28,
2003) (Doc. #03-2231), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.
asp?searchmode=simple [hereinafter Minutes of Feb. 21, 2003 Meeting].
99. See WTO Council for TRIPS, Minutes of Meeting, Doc. IP/C/M/20 (Oct.
15, 1998) (Doc. #98-3989), para. 48, available at http://docsonline.wto.org/
gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple (comments from the New Zealand representative) [hereinafter Minutes of September 17, 1998 Meeting]; WTO Council
for TRIPS, Minutes of Meeting, IP/C/M/22 (Apr. 9, 1999) (Doc. #99-1407),
paras. 83, 85, 86 (comments from the New Zealand representative, Chile representative, and Korea representative, respectively that coverage should not
extend to spirits), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?
searchmode=simple; WTO Council for TRIPS, Minutes of Meeting, IP/C/M/21
(Jan 22. 1999) (Doc. #99-0240), para. 82, available at http://docsonline.wto.org/
gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple (comments from the Argentine representative stating that spirits fell outside the scope of negotiations).
100. See Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 96. The Doha Ministerial
Declaration notes that the TRIPS Council will handle this under the Declara-
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tions of this mandate. Some Members argue that the Ministerial Declarations, like those approved in Singapore or Doha, are
mere political declarations that cannot extend, generalize, or
modify what has been settled by an international treaty.101
Others affirm that Ministerial Conferences can modify the literal sense of some provisions of such treaties102 because of the
tion’s paragraph 12 (which deals with implementation issues). Paragraph 12
offers two tracks:
(a) where we provide a specific negotiating mandate in this Declaration, the relevant implementation issues shall be addressed under
that mandate; (b) the other outstanding implementation issues shall
be addressed as a matter of priority by the relevant WTO bodies,
which shall report to the Trade Negotiations Committee, established
under paragraph 46 below, by the end of 2002 for appropriate action.
Id. at para. 12.
101. In the final phase of negotiations of the Doha Ministerial Declaration,
enough divergences arose among WTO Members as to whether this Declaration could or could not establish new mandates of negotiation not strictly established under the WTO Agreements. The Communication presented by
Argentina rejected any legal relevance to the Doha Declaration with respect to
the extension of additional GI protection to products other than wines and
spirits, when no specific disposition existed in the WTO Agreements. WTO
Ministerial Conference, Fourth Session, Communication from Argentina Regarding Paragraphs 18 and 12 of the Draft Ministerial Declaration,
WT/MIN(01)/W/8 (Nov. 12, 2001) (Doc #01-5726), available at http://docs
online.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple. Alternatively, the Communication presented two days later by Bulgaria, the European Community
and their Member States, Slovenia, Hungary, Kenya, Liechtenstein, Mauritius, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Czech Republic, the Slovakian Republic, Sri
Lanka, Switzerland, Thailand and Turkey emphasized these Members’ belief
that paragraphs 18 and 12 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration clearly established a mandate to initiate negotiations on the extension of additional protection. WTO Ministerial Conference, Fourth Session, Communication from
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, the European Communities and its Member
States, Hungary, Liechtenstein, Kenya, Mauritius, Pakistan, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Thailand, and Turkey Regarding
Paragraphs 18 and 12 of the Draft Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(01)/W/11
(Nov. 14, 2001) (Doc. #01-5796), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/
gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple; see also WTO Ministerial Conference,
Fourth Session, Communication from Bulgaria, Kenya, India, and Sri Lanka
Regarding Paragraphs 18 and 12 of the Draft Ministerial Declaration,
WT/MIN(01)/W/9 (Nov. 13, 2001) (Doc. #01-5779), available at http://docs
online.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple.
102. It is doubtful that the Doha Ministerial Declaration could be defined as
an interpretation of the Ministerial Conference following the recommendations established in Article IX.2 of the WTO Agreement, since the parties did
not show any evidence of consideration of this provision when drafting the
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authority of interpretation attributed to the Ministerial Conference on Treaties signed in the Uruguay Round.103
Thus far, the focus of the analysis has been on how the mandate established in Article 23.4 of TRIPS should be interpreted.
The next section advances the debate by outlining a few main
proposals presented by the TRIPS Council about the notification and registration system of GIs.
B. Differing Proposals on the Nature of the Registration System
The submissions that have been presented at the TRIPS
Council for the establishment of a multilateral notification and
registration system for GIs can be divided into two camps. The
first is a minimalist approach defended by the United States,
Australia, New Zealand, Japan, along with many Latin American countries. These nations advocate a voluntary system
Declaration. Perhaps the best explanation is that the Declaration was
adopted following Article III.2 of the WTO Agreement. See generally J. Thuo
Gathii, The Legal Status of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health
under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
292 (2002); Daya Shanker, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the
Dispute Settlement System of the WTO and the Doha Declaration on the
TRIPS Agreement, 36(4) J. WORLD TRADE 721, 722 (2002). Some analysts have
suggested that the Doha Declaration must be seen as an understanding similar to the six understandings of the GATT passed during the Uruguay Round.
See Steve Charnovitz, The Legal Status of the Doha Declarations, 207 J. OF
INT’L ECON. L. 207, 211 (2002). It must be observed that in the case United
States - Import Prohibition on Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, the Appellate Body noted the statements established in the Report of a WTO Council
on Trade and Environment, which was part of a Report of the General Council
for the Singapore Conference. WTO Report of the Appellate Body, United
States – Import Prohibitions of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) (Doc. #98-3899), 38 I.L.M. 118, para. 168,
available at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple.
Thus, if a Report of a WTO body can be useful to interpret the WTO law, it
should be even more useful for a Decision of the Ministerial Conference.
103. WTO Agreement, supra note 84, art. IX.2. In several cases, GATT
Panels have emphasized the authority of the Ministerial Conference and the
General Council. See, e.g., WTO Report of the Appellate Body in the case
Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R,
WT/DS/11/AB/R, sec. E (Oct. 4, 1996) (Doc. #96-3951), available at
http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple; Report of the
Panel in the case European Economic Community Restriction on Imports of
th
Apples from Chile, GATT B.I.S.D. (36 Supp.) 93, para. 12.1 (July 1990) (denominating the Ministerial Conference’s interpretation as “authentic
interpretation of a treaty”).
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characterized by its transparency. It would create no legal
rights, and consequently, the inscription of a GI would not require protection by other Members. The second proposal advocating a minimalist approach is presented by Hong Kong,
China, in which the inscription of a GI into the register would
lack a process of substantive examination or opposition at the
multilateral level. The inscription would be put into effect only
after a cursory, formal examination of the GI subject to notification and questions relating to the conformity of a GI with Article 22.1. The applicability of the exceptions would remain in
the local jurisdiction in accordance with domestic law. The obligation to give legal effect to registration under the system
would only be binding on participating Members.
The second group advocates a maximalist approach. Members of the European Union, Switzerland, former Eastern bloc
countries, and a selection of developing countries champion this
view. The maximalist approach supports a compulsory system
in which a GI would benefit from unconditional protection in
the markets of all Members upon its inscription in the register.
1. The Minimalist Approach
i) The United States-led Proposal
The primary proposal advocating a minimalist approach was
presented by the United States, Canada, Chile and Japan (U.S.led Proposal).104 The system of notification and registration of
104. The first proposal presented by the United States and Japan was the
Communication dated March 11, 1999. WTO Council for TRIPS, Proposal for
a Multilateral System for Notification and Registration of Geographic Indications for Wines and Spirits Based on Article 23.4 of the TRIPS Agreement,
IP/C/W/133 (Mar. 11, 1999) (Doc. #99-0978), available at http://
docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple [hereinafter U.S.-led
Proposal]. This proposal was later sponsored by Canada and Chile. WTO
Council for TRIPS, Proposal for a Multilateral System for Notification and
Registration of Geographic Indications for Wines and Spirits Based on Article
23.4 of the TRIPS Agreement, IP/C/W/133/Rev.1 (July 26, 1999) (Doc. #993125), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode
=simple. Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, and New Zealand also supported the U.S. initiative. WTO Council for TRIPS, Special Session, Multilateral System of Notification of Geographical Indications for Wines (and Spirits),
WTO Doc. TN/IP/W/6 (Oct. 29, 2002) (Doc. #02-5938), available at
http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple. Also providing

File: Martin Macro 122704.doc

2004]

Created on: 12/27/2004 1:35 PM

Last Printed: 12/27/2004 1:36 PM

GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS

143

GIs urged in this approach is characterized solely by its informative nature. The system proposed would not create legal
rights, and consequently, the inscription of a GI would not require protection by other Members.105 Under this proposal, registration follows receipt by the administering body of notifications from participating Members. It includes notification in a
searchable database of all GIs for wines and spirits and affirms
the principle that GIs are territorial rights and, therefore, the
conditions for granting and exercising them must be established
in national legislations of WTO Members.106 For that reason,
the minimalist approach conceives of a voluntary system of notification and registration.107 This means that any GI for wines
or spirits established in accordance with national legislation is
entitled to protection under Part II, Section 3, of the TRIPS,
regardless of whether it is registered in the WTO database.108
Members wishing to participate in this system submit to the
Secretariat a list of domestic GIs eligible for protection under
their national legislation, indicating the date, if any, on which
protection will expire.109 Subsequent notifications include additional domestic GIs eligible for protection under a Member's
national legislation and any previously-notified GIs no longer
eligible for such protection.110 Following receipt of notifications,
support to the minimalist approach is Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, the Philippines, Guatemala, Honduras, Namibia, the Dominican Republic and Chinese Taipei. WTO Council for TRIPS, Special Session, Multilateral System of Notification of Geographical Indications for Wines (and Spirits), WTO Doc. TN/IP/W/5 (Oct. 23, 2002) (Doc. #02-5799), available at
http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple.
The October
29, 2002 Communication represents the most recent contribution from these
countries to the debate on the establishment of a multilateral system of notification and registry of GIs.
105. U.S.-led Proposal, supra note 104, art. 3.
106. Id.
107. Id. para. 4.
108. Id. para. 3.
109. Id. The lists shall provide, with respect to each indication, the WTO
Member that notified the indication, the expiration date of protection, if any,
and any other multilateral agreement for GIs under which the indication is
protected. The database, in turn, would include: the GI for the wine or spirit
that has been notified, the WTO Member which has made the notification, the
date on which the indication is protected by the notifying Member, the expiration date, if any, and any agreement under which the indication is protected.
110. Id. para. 2.
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the Secretariat will compile a database of all notified GIs for
wines and spirits and distribute copies to all Members.111 After
the initial notification, the Secretariat will revise the database
of notified GIs, adding or deleting indications in accordance
with Members’ notifications. Moreover, the proposal states
that, in accordance with Article 23.3, identical or similar GIs
may be submitted by more than one WTO Member, provided
that the GI is recognized by each notifying WTO Member in
accordance with its national regime for protecting GIs.
With regard to the effects under national legislation, participants would be legally bound to consult the database, along
with other sources of information, when making decisions regarding the recognition and protection of GIs for wines and
spirits.112 Registration in the multilateral system would not
give rise to any presumption regarding eligibility for protection
given the territorial nature of GIs and the application of Article
24 exceptions, which would remain in force under national law.
Non-participants would be encouraged to refer to the database,
along with other sources of information, in making such decisions under their national legislation.113 Thus, Members’ participation would be limited to receiving these lists, among other
sources of information, when they must make decisions on the
protection in their territories of GIs of other Members.114

111. Id. (“The Secretariat shall have no discretion to decline acceptance of a
GI notified by a WTO Member.”).
112. See id.
113. Id. The proposal asserts that
[i]nformation obtained from WTO Multilateral Systems for Wines
and Spirits would be taken into account in making those decisions in
accordance with that national legislation. . . . WTO Members not participating in the system will be encouraged to refer to the WTO Multilateral System for Wines and Spirits, along with other sources of information, in making decisions under their national legislation. . . . in
order to ensure that such decisions are based on the most complete
information available.
Id.
114. This assertion appears to conform with U.S. law, in which the right of
an interested party to challenge the use of a particular GI in the United
States does not extend to the right to challenge the compliance by the United
States with its obligations under the TRIPS Agreement. See 19 U.S.C. §
3512(c).
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With regard to appeals or objections, the proposal sets out
that decisions concerning protection for GIs, regardless of
whether the WTO is notified, should occur at the national level
at the request of interested parties.115 Should any appeal or objection result in a final decision that a domestic GI is ineligible
for protection, that Member should notify the Secretariat during the subsequent notification period.116
ii) Hong Kong Proposal
The second proposal advocating the minimalist approach was
presented by Hong Kong.117 Although this proposal attempts to
reconcile the minimalist approach of the U.S.-led Proposal with
the maximalist approach of the European Community, it is not
truly a middle-ground proposal. Instead, it is much closer to
the other minimalist proposals.
The Hong Kong Proposal proffers a multilateral system that
would involve only a cursory formal examination of the GI subject to notification.118 This would contain basic information
115. U.S.-led Proposal, supra note 104, para. 2.
116. Apart from the proposal relative to the multilateral register, the
United States presented another proposal arguing that one acceptable means
of protecting GIs would be protection through the trademark system. See
WTO Council for TRIPS, Suggested Method for Domestic Recognition of Geographical Indications for WTO Members to Produce a List of NationallyProtected Geographical Indications, IP/C/W/134 (Mar. 11, 1999) (Doc #990979), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode
=simple. According to this proposal, using the trademark system to protect
GIs would have the main advantage that no additional commitment of resources would be required to protect GIs. In other words, a government’s use
of its existing trademark regime to protect GIs would involve only government
resources already committed to the trademark system for applications, registrations, oppositions, cancellations, adjudication, and enforcement. However,
in my opinion, while the trademark regime may be advantageous to the
United States, it is not an ideal model for multilateral GI protection.
117. Although it does not have any substantive commercial interest in GIs,
Hong Kong presented a proposal about the negotiating mandate under Article
23.4. See WTO Council for TRIPS, Special Session, Multilateral System of
Notification and Registration of Geographical Indications Under Article 23.4
of the TRIPS Agreement, TN/IP/W/8 (Apr. 23, 2003) (Doc #03-2166), available
at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple. [hereinafter
Hong Kong Proposal].
118. Id. sec. III.4.i (“The multilateral system involves only a formality examination of the geographical indication subject to notification. Provided that
basic information identifying the geographical indication, its ownership, and
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identifying the GI and its ownership and the basis on which it
would be entered in the register.119 In terms of formal legal effects, registration on the multilateral register would constitute
prima facie evidence of: (a) ownership; (b) that the indication
was within the definition under Article 22.1; and (c) that it was
protected in the country of origin.120 These three issues would
be deemed valid unless evidence to the contrary was produced
by an opposing party.121 If such a party adduced evidence to the
contrary, then national tribunals would weigh all the evidence
and decide whether the issues and questions were proved to the
standard required by the proceedings.122 According to the Hong
Kong Proposal, this rebuttable presumption would help the presumed owner of the GI discharge the legal burden of proof on
the three issues in the course of domestic proceedings.123 Consequently, according to the Hong Kong Proposal, this would facilitate GI protection through Members’ domestic legal systems.124 The proposed framework would not change substantive
legal rights of either party to a proceeding. For instance, questions relating to the conformity of a GI with Article 22.1 would
remain in the local jurisdiction in accordance with domestic
law. Questions relating to the applicability of the exceptions
under Article 22.4 would continue to be decided by Members’
domestic authorities. Inscription in the multilateral register
would not have any legal effect or create any presumption in
relation to these issues, except as it related to Article 24.9.125
the basis on which it is claimed to be protected in the country of origin is submitted to the responsible authority, the indication will be entered on the register.”).
119. Id. annex A, para. B.1 (“The examination process does not involve substantive examination.”).
120. Id. annex A, para. D.2.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. sec.III.4.v.
124. Id.
125. Id. sec.III.4.iv.
Registration should be accepted by participating Members’ domestic
courts, tribunals or administrative bodies as prima facie evidence of:
(a) ownership; (b) that the indication is within the definition of ‘geographical indications’ under Article 22.1 of the TRIPS Agreement;
and (c) that it is protected in the country of origin. The intention is
that the issues will be deemed to have been proved unless evidence to
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The system would also not deal with competing claims for GIs,
which would continue under national law. However, the Hong
Kong Proposal suffers greatly because the lack of a substantive
examination or opposition at the multilateral level limits the
legal effects of registration to the rights holder.
With regard to participation, the Proposal establishes a voluntary system under which Members would be free to participate and make notifications of GIs protected in their territories.126 The obligation to give legal effect to registration under
the system would only be binding on participating Members.127
iii) Shortcomings of the Minimalist Approach
The U.S.-led Proposal offers as its main objective a minimalist, limited information system in which national GIs would be
notified and incorporated automatically.128 However, the legal
effects that, in principle, the inscription of a GI in the database
would have are not specified, explicitly or implicitly.129 This
the contrary is produced by the other party to the proceedings before
domestic courts, tribunals or administrative bodies when dealing
with matters related to geographical indications. In effect, a rebuttable presumption is created in favor of owners of geographical indications in relation to the three relevant issues.
Id.
126. Id. annex A, para. E. (“Participation in the system is voluntary which
means that: 1. Members should be free to participate and notify GIs protected
in their territories; 2. The obligation to give legal effect to registrations under
the system will only be binding upon Members choosing to participate in the
system.”).
127. Id.
128. Milo G. Coerper, Certification Marks as a Means of Protecting
Geographical Indications, 1997-1998 A.B.A. SEC. INTELL. PROP. L., ANN. REP.,
COMMITTEE 202, http://www.abanet.org/intelprop/97-98rep/202.html (supporting this proposal, Coerper states that the system should not be obligatory for
all WTO Members, but it could be a system of merely informative nature). See
also Lynne Beresford, The Protection of Geographical Indications in the
United States, in SYMPOSIUM ON THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF
GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS 48 (1999) (indicating that any registration system
that finally is created would have to avoid the creation of additional obligations for WTO Members) [hereinafter Symposium 1999].
129. In the Meeting of the TRIPS Council on April 21–22, 1999, the U.S.
Representative stated, “[t]he fact that a particular geographical indication
was registered would not automatically obligate a Member to protect that
geographical indication if it were not entitled to such protection under that
Member’s TRIPS-consistent national law.” WTO Council for TRIPS, Minutes
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proposal does not provide for a system with a truly multilateral
character. It attempts to be no more than an information system where national GIs may be notified and automatically
listed on a database to be established in the future by the
WTO.130 Therefore, it is difficult to understand the added value
of the system envisioned in the U.S.-led Proposal. Although the
burden on the WTO would be limited under this proposal, the
costs entailed would not be compensated by any benefits other
than those already existing at the national level and under notifications made on the basis of Article 63.2.131
A multilateral register clearly implies multilateral protection,
and this must be the key element in establishing such a register.132 However, the U.S.-led Proposal is limited to creating a
of Meeting, IP/C/M/23 (June 2, 1999) (Doc. #99-2220), para. 51, available at
http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple. From this affirmation, it can be deduced that the database would add nothing new and,
consequently, would clearly not be useful “to facilitate the protection of geographical indications” as Article 23.4 prescribes. Id.
130. See WTO Council for TRIPS, Communication from the European Communities and their Member States, WTO IP/C/W/260 (May 30, 2001) (Doc. #012709), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode
=simple. The Communication lists criticisms of the minimalist approach. For
example, it states, “[i]n a number of respects, [the U.S.-led Proposal] does not
seem to constitute more than a mere database. It is not clear to us how the
facilitation of the protection of [GIs], as requested in Article 23.4 of the TRIPS
Agreement, would be ensured by a system limited to a mere database.” Id.
131. Article 63.2 states:
Members shall notify the laws and regulations referred to in paragraph 1 to the Council for TRIPS in order to assist that Council in its
review of the operation of this Agreement. The Council shall attempt
to minimize the burden on Members in carrying out this obligation
and may decide to waive the obligation to notify such laws and regulations directly to the Council if consultations with WIPO on the establishment of a common register containing these laws and regulations are successful. The Council shall also consider in this connection any action required regarding notifications pursuant to the obligations under this Agreement stemming from the provisions of Article 6ter of the Paris Convention (1967).
Id.
132. See WTO Council for TRIPS, Communication from the European Communities and their Member States, WTO IP/C/W/260 (May 30, 2001) (Doc. #012709), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode
=simple. The EC attacks the minimalist approach for failure to understand
the scope of the terms “notification” and “registration.” As used in the U.S.led Proposal, “notification implies only transparency of information in a vol-
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record rather than a true registration, as it only refers to legal
effects under national legislation.133 The system does not provide for a mechanism to filter out names that should not be protected and, therefore, risks creating more confusion than clarity.134 The proposal is silent on the need for elements of proof,
for the assessment of eligibility, or for an opposition procedure
— elements which are indispensable to a future multilateral
register.135 It is impossible under this approach to ensure that
terms that do not meet the provisions of Articles 22.1 or 24.9, or
which fall under one of the exceptions provided for in Article 24,
are denied eligibility.
The U.S.-led Proposal also does not establish procedures to
resolve possible litigation, an indispensable procedure for any
future multilateral register.136 At the same time, the proposal
leaves open the possibility for Members to end or interrupt their
participation without legal ramifications. The great uncer-

untary and administratively simple system, while the term registration implies no legal effects. Consequently, it would appear that the provisions on
notification and registration are identical in the joint Proposal.” Id.
133. U.S.-led Proposal, supra note 104, art. 3. (“Any [GI] for wines or spirits
established in accordance with national legislation is entitled to protection
under Section 3 of Part II of the TRIPS Agreement, whether or not it is registered in the WTO database.” (emphasis added)).
134. Minutes of June 28, 2002 Meeting, supra note 91, para. 75.
135. The U.S.-led Proposal makes reference neither to national legislation
providing for protection, nor to the date on which each GI first received protection.
136. Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, New Zealand and the United
States clarify that if an opposition system is to be established, the right to
invoke the exceptions provided for in Article 24 would be undermined because
they would have to be used through the system and would be subject to the
successful result of the opposition procedure. WTO Council for TRIPS, Special
Session, Multilateral System of Notification of Geographical Indications for
Wines (and Spirits), WTO Doc. TN/IP/W/6 (Oct. 29, 2002) (Doc. #02-5938),
para. 22, available at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode
=simple. Nevertheless, from my point of view, the establishment of this opposition system would have the ability to systemize the application of these exceptions and in no case would they be undermined, as its application could
continue to be demanded by WTO Members. However, Article 24.1 demands
the continuous obligation for all WTO Members to accept negotiations on the
continuity of the application of these exceptions. TRIPS, supra note 2, art.
24.1 (“Members shall be willing to consider the continued applicability of
these provisions to individual GIs whose use was the subject of such negotiations.”).

File: Martin Macro 122704.doc

150

Created on: 12/27/2004 1:35 PM

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

Last Printed: 12/27/2004 1:36 PM

[Vol. 30:1

tainty regarding the legal effects of the system may thus increase litigation and, consequently, administrative costs.137
As to the voluntary system upon which the U.S.-led Proposal
insisted, it is unclear whether non-participating Members
would be bound to give protection according to Article 23.138 If
non-participating Members were not bound, the protections announced in Article 23.4 would be undermined. The literal
meaning of the U.S.-led Proposal is based on a political commitment without legal force:139 authorities would be bound to
refer to the register, yet the register gives rise to no national
legal commitment.140 The U.S.-led Proposal also does not provide for any monitoring mechanism which requires national
authorities to “refer” to the lists of GIs on the database. As a
result, these national authorities will not know whether to rely
on the information included in the system when making a determination on the protection of a GI.141
For these reasons, it is difficult to understand how the mandate to facilitate the protection of GIs established in Article 23.4
would be fulfilled through this system. This proposal would
establish a mere juxtaposition of existing national protection
systems in a database without legal effects. As such, its value
would be minimal. Assuredly, Article 23.4 calls for more ambitious action than this proposal offers. The proposal concentrates on the first part of the job, namely the establishment of a
notification system, while the register would simply compile

137. Minutes of June 28, 2002 Meeting, supra note 91, para. 69.
138. U.S.-led Proposal, supra note 104, art 4 (“The proposed system is entirely voluntary and would not impose undue burdens.”).
139. In the U.S.-led Proposal, the proponents of this system expressly establish that
WTO Members not participating in the system will be encouraged to
refer to the WTO Multilateral System for Wines and Spirits, along
with other sources of information, in making decisions under their
national legislation involving recognition or protection of GIs for
wines and spirits in order to ensure that such decisions are based on
the most complete information available….
Id. art. 3. This Communication also clarifies that this system will not generate specific obligations for the Members that decide not to participate.
140. Minutes of June 28, 2002 Meeting, supra note 91, paras. 69, 75.
141. Minutes of Feb. 21, 2003 Meeting, supra note 98, para. 66.
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142
participating Members’ information. This does not satisfy the
requirement of producing legal effects that registration inherently entails in the context of intellectual property rights.143 A
database which national authorities might or might not be required to refer to does not constitute a registration system in
the intellectual property context. The costs of establishing and
operating such a system should not be measured in absolute
terms but, rather, in relation to the benefit offered by the system. If transparency alone is the only advantage offered by the
proposed U.S.-led system, it might not be sufficient to justify its
costs. To “facilitate” the legal protection of GIs under Article
23.4, a multilateral system should help administering bodies
implement, and producers and consumers avail themselves of,
legal protection.144
The U.S.-led proposal wrongly emphasizes the convenience of
using national systems of trademark protection for GIs.145 Traditionally, confusion has existed between certification marks
and GIs, fundamentally because of their similarities.146 But,
GIs and trademarks are inherently different intellectual prop-

142. The EC Communication takes the view that the U.S.-led Proposal conflates “notification” and “registration” into one concept because registration
carries with it no legal effects. See WTO Council for TRIPS, Communication
from the European Communities and their Member States, WTO IP/C/W/260
(May 30, 2001) (Doc. #01-2709), available at http://docsonline.wto.
org/gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple (“It would appear that the provisions
on notification and registration are identical in the [U.S.-led Proposal].”).
143. This can be deduced from other sections of TRIPS which employ the
word “registration,” most notably in Part II, Section 2, on trademarks. TRIPS,
supra note 2, arts. 15, 18–19.
144. See Minutes of June 28, 2002 Meeting, supra note 91, paras. 68, 81.
145. U.S.-led Proposal, supra note 104 (“The proposed system does this by
providing an uncomplicated and efficient system for notification and registration of the geographical indications for wines and spirits that we recognized in
the national systems of individual WTO Members.”).
146. Burkhart Goebel, Geographical Indications and Trademarks – The
Road from Doha, 93 TRADEMARK REP. 964, 982 (“Although GIs are recognized
as a type of intellectual property pursuant to Art. 1 (2) of the TRIPS Agreement, it is sometimes argued that GIs cannot be considered as another form of
intellectual property right since protection to the individual using a GI is effectuated only as a reflex of protecting a certain regional collective goodwill.”).
In my opinion, however, this interpretation is incompatible with the TRIPS
Agreement, which clearly defines GIs as intellectual property rights and as
private rights.
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147
Requirements applied to certification marks are
erty rights.
much simpler than those applied to GIs. Also, the procedures to
protect certification trademarks are different from those used
for the protection of GIs. In addition, a trademark has a limited
duration. Although its registry is renewable, GIs have no expiration date so long as they are protected in their country of origin.148 Finally, a trademark system does not protect GIs against

147. A conflict not definitively resolved is the relationship between Article
16 of TRIPS (which grants the holder of a registered trademark the exclusive
right to prevent all third parties not having the owner’s consent from using in
the course of trade signs for goods or services which are identical or similar to
those with registered trademarks where such use would result in a likelihood
of confusion) and the provisions of Part II, Section 3 of TRIPS about the conflict between GIs and trademarks (Articles 22.3, 23.2 and 24.5 of TRIPS,
which establish that geographical trademarks that mislead the public can
only coexist with GIs when they exist prior to the adoption of TRIPS, granting, consequently, a certain priority to the GIs in conflict). Some authors deduce from Article 16 that this conflict must be resolved according to the principle “First in Time, First in Right” to make compatible public and private
interests promoted by both parties. For these authors, GIs must be seen as a
“sign” in the Article 16 sense, which would let the holder of a previously registered trademark prevent the use of a concrete GI if there exists a likelihood of
confusion. See Norma Dawson, Locating Geographical Indications – Perspectives From English Law, 90 TRADEMARK REP. 590, 599 (2000); Harte Bavendamm, Geographical Indications and Trademarks: Harmony or Conflict?, in
Symposium 1999, supra note 128, at 61; Clark W. Lackert, Geographical Indication: What Does the TRIPS Agreement Require?, 109 TRADEMARK WORLD 22,
39 (1998); Florent Gevers, Topical Issues of the Protection of Geographical
Indications, in SYMPOSIUM ON THE PROTECTION OF GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS
IN THE WORLDWIDE CONTEXT 154–55 (1997); Vincent E. O’Brien, Appellations
of Origin and Brands of Geographical Significance: A Conflict with Potentially
Serious Commercial Implications, 23 INT’L WINE L. ASSOC. BULL. 34 (2000),
available at http://www.aidv.org/bulletin/bull23_09-2000.htm; D. J. Ryan, The
Protection of Geographical Indications, in ESTUDIOS SOBRE PROPIEDAD
INDUSTRIAL HOMENAJE A M. CURREL 425 (2000); W. Taylor, The Overlap Between Trademarks and Geographical Indications, 5 INT’L WINE L. ASSOC.
BULL. 18 (1999), available at http://www.aidv.org/bulletin/bull31_04-2003.
htm. In regard to the relationship between GIs and trademarks, the International Trademark Association (INTA) adopted a resolution in 1997 supporting
the “First in Time, First in Right” principle. INTA, Request for Action by the
INTA Board of Directors, Protection of Geographical Indications and Trademarks, Sept. 24, 1997, at http://www.inta.org/policy/res_geoindtms.html (last
visited Oct. 18, 2004). However, from my point of view, Articles 2–24 of
TRIPS are lex specialis which takes precedence over the general rule for the
protection of trademarks set out in Article 16.
148. See TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 24.9 (“There shall be no obligation under
this Agreement to protect geographical indications which are not or cease to
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abusive use in translated form, in connection with modifiers
such as “like,” “kind,” “style,” “type,” or “imitation,” or in conjunction with the true origin of the producer. Thus, although
the system of certification marks may have certain advantages,
in no case could it replace a specific system of protection of GIs,
whose creation Article 23.4 demands.149
The incompatibility of the U.S.-led proposed system with the
obligations arising from TRIPS can hardly be overstated. If the
trademark system was capable of providing absolute protection
to GIs, the question relative to such protection would have been
resolved in the trademarks section of TRIPS.150 In TRIPS, the
be protected in their country of origin, or which have fallen into disuse in that
country.”).
149. Possibly, as Michael Maher has stated, GIs and trademarks might
communicate different information to the consumer. Maher, supra note 12, at
1925 n.47.
A consumer presumably understands that a product may be produced
by any business in the region identified by the geographical indication. The geographic term may describe not only the product’s geographic origin, but also might connote specific qualities, features, or
characteristics associated with similar products from that location,
regardless of the individual identity of their producer.
Id.
150. The U.S.-led Proposal suggests that the protection system of GIs
through the trademarks system is perfectly compatible with TRIPS, thus fulfilling all the prescriptions of Part II, Section 3 of TRIPS, in addition to the
principle of national treatment established in Art. 3. See WTO Council for
TRIPS, Suggested Method for Domestic Recognition of Geographical Indications for WTO Members to Produce a List of Nationally-Protected Geographical
Indications, IP/C/W/134 (Mar. 11, 1999) (Doc #99-0979), available at
http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple. This compatibility was reiterated by the United States in the Meeting of the TRIPS Council held on April 21–22, 1999. See WTO Council for TRIPS, Minutes of Meeting, IP/C/M/23 (June 2, 1999) (Doc. #99-2220), para. 51, available at
http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple. In this meeting, the U.S. Representative affirmed that the protection of GIs by means of
certification marks is a system which is compatible with the TRIPS Agreement and constitutes a way to fulfill the Section III obligations. At the same
time, however, the U.S. Representative admitted that it was not the only system compatible with the Agreement. See also, Eleanor Meltzer, Geographical
Indications: Point of View of Governments, Address Before the Worldwide
Symposium on Geographical Indications (July 9–11, 2003) (outlining the U.S.
position that the trademark regime can protect GIs and the shortcomings of
the EC approach), available at http://www.wipo.int/meetings/2003/geo-ind/en/
program/index.htm.
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specific nature of GI protection is embodied in the reference
made in Article 22.1 to the quality and particular characteristics of a product coming from a specific area. A link with production in a specific area is, however, alien to the trademark
system. The bond with production in a certain zone is not
linked to the trademarks system established in Part II, Section
2 of the Agreement. For these reasons, giving priority to the
trademark system would simply deny the specificity and the
interests of having an ad hoc regime, such as that embodied in
Part II, Section 3. Also, it is necessary to keep in mind that
trademark protection systems and examination requests relative to those trademarks differ among states. The U.S.-led Proposal would have the effect of transferring the faculty that corresponds with the origin country to decide on the existence of
the GIs to the country where the registry request has appeared.
Likewise, it is highly questionable whether the elements of
the Hong Kong Proposal could achieve the purpose of the mandated multilateral system enunciated in Article 23.4. Similar to
the U.S.-led Proposal, this proposal envisions a voluntary element because Members would be free to notify and register
their GIs, but enforcement would vary substantially.151 Seemingly the multilateral system would have legal effects for some
Members, but it would really serve as a plurilateral instrument.
With regard to the formal examination proposed by the Hong
Kong plan, such a simple examination would not facilitate protection152 because of the significant risk that such a system
would contain unreliable information.
The Hong Kong Proposal also established a renewable tenyear term of protection.153 This was inspired by the system of
protection of trademarks. Nothing in the future system should
prejudice how Members implement their obligations under
TRIPS, a point of the utmost importance to all delegations. The
Hong Kong Proposal fails to understand that, unlike the case of
trademarks, TRIPS does not require GI renewal. Rather, GI
protection under TRIPS appears to be available for as long it

151. Hong Kong Proposal, supra note 117, annex A, para. E.
152. Id. annex A, para. B (“The examination process does not involve substantive examination.”).
153. Id. annex A, para. C.
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154
Undoubtedly, a renewal
was given in the country of origin.
system would prove more difficult and costly.

2. The Maximalist Approach
i) The EC Proposal
The proposal advocating maximum protection and legal effect
for the GI registration and notification system was presented by
155
This proposal
the EC and its Member States (EC Proposal).
provides for a full registration system and combines elements
from the Lisbon Agreement156 and EC Regulation 2081/92.157
This proposal favors clarity and legal certainty on the protection of GIs by advocating for the creation of a system that has
154. There is no indication in Articles 22–24 that a GI is subject to a shorter
period requiring renewal measures.
155. WTO Council for TRIPS, Communication from the European Communities and Their Member States, Proposal for a Multilateral Register of Geographical Indications for Wines and Spirits Based on Article 23.4 of the TRIPS
Agreement, IP/C/W/107 (July 28, 1998) (Doc. #98-2930), available at
http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple.
The original
proposal was revised two years later. WTO Council for TRIPS, Communication from the European Communities and Their Member States, Implementation of Article 23.4 of the TRIPS Agreement Relating to the Establishment of a
Multilateral System of Notification and Registration of Geographical Indications, IP/C/W/107/Rev.1 (June 22, 2000) (Doc. # 00-2521), available at
http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple [hereinafter EC
Proposal].
156. The Lisbon Agreement, supra note 4. See David R. Downes, How Intellectual Property Could Be a Tool to Protect Traditional Knowledge, 25 COLUM.
J. ENVTL. L. 253, 273 (2000) (proposing the use of the Lisbon Agreement for
the Protection of Appellations of Origin as a model for local, regional, and
international registration systems).
157. Under the Regulation (EEC) N. 2081/92 the protected designation of
origin (PDO) allows agricultural producers in Member States an exclusive
right to the name of a particular foodstuff that is determined to be unique
because the production, processing, or preparation takes place in a specific
area using local expertise and resources. The protected geographical indication (PGI) also gives an exclusive right to a name for foodstuffs, but unlike the
PDO, it does not require unique characteristics associated with a specific geographical environment. EEC N. 2081/92, supra note 37. Instead, the PGI
grants protection for products due to their reputation. See also S. D. Goldberg, Who will Raise the White Flag? The Battle Between the United States
and the European Union over the Protection of Geographical Indications, 22
U.PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 107, 141–44 (2001); CORTÉS MARTÍN, supra note 29, at
325–451.
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158
In the first stage, Members notify their doseveral stages.
mestic GIs together with regional, bilateral, or multilateral
agreements protecting such GIs and proof of compliance with
the definition of GIs to the Secretariat.159 In the second stage,
the Secretariat notifies all Members of the submission.160 The
Members then have an eighteen-month period in which to examine the submission.161 During that period, each Member may
challenge the registration of the GI on any of the following four

158. The European Commission asserts that GI protection provides competitive benefits. European Commission, Agricultural Directorate General VI,
Agricultural Report 1998: Quality - Winning Markets and Reputation, at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/publi/review98/p09_en.htm (last visited
Oct. 18, 2004). The Commission participates in publicity campaigns, declaring the high quality of the products with a given designation, to raise awareness of the GIs both within the EC as well as in other markets. Not all commentators, however, share such a sanguine view of geographic indications.
See, e.g., Charles Lister, Protectionism and Integration: Designations of Origin
for Foodstuffs in the European Community, 47 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 639, 639–40
(1992). One perspective sees Regulation 2081/92 as a protectionist policy,
disguised under the banner of food quality. Such a policy actually contravenes
the EC's overriding purpose of market integration. Id. For a similar criticism
leveled against trademarks, see M.A. Cunningham, A Complementary Existence: An Economic Assessment of the Trademark and Competition Law Interface in the European Community, 10 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 141, 150 (1995)
("Perception advertising distorts competition by deflecting sales from lowerpriced substitutes of equal or greater quality by differentiating products in the
eyes of a target audience solely on the basis of a perception.").
159. EC Proposal, supra note 155.
Notification to the Secretariat shall be accompanied by … prima facie
evidence of the geographical indication’s conformity with the provisions of the Agreement…. Each participating Member may provide
any other information it considers useful for the Agreement’s implementation and for national application of the Prohibition on the use
of geographical indications for non-originating products.
Id. (emphasis added). As to the question of what kind of proof would be appropriate, Members should not limit themselves as to what should be recognized as acceptable proof, in order to take into account the different legal systems in WTO Members. It could be the relevant legislation, but it could also
be national certificates of registration, information on the original characteristics of the product, statistics of production, national regulations on the quality
applicable to the product and the existence of producers’ associations. Certainly, elements of proof should fully support an application for registration,
and when objections to a registration are being raised, they should fully support the objections.
160. Id. para. C.
161. Id.
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grounds for opposition: non-compliance with the general definition of a GI;162 absence of protection in the country of origin,163
164
165
genericness, and that the use of the GI would be misleading.
During the eighteen months following the publication by the
Secretariat, the Members would be able to examine the GI’s
legitimacy by requesting explanations from the Member who
presented the registration request. During this period, if a
Member properly challenged the protection of a proposed GI,
bilateral negotiations would be undertaken with the aim of
reaching an agreement.166
As far as who must demonstrate the grounds for opposition,
the EC Proposal establishes that, in accordance with the TRIPS
provisions and the normal legal practice in the WTO, the Member invoking the benefit must demonstrate that it has fulfilled
the necessary conditions.167 According to this principle, Members must invoke the exception and prove its applicability if the
Member trying to register the GI does not agree.168
Once the period of eighteen months from publication ends,
the GI would be inscribed in the register.169 If, during that time,
there has been no opposition, the EC Proposal establishes that
162. See TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 22.1.
163. See id. art. 25.9.
164. See id. art. 24.6.
165. See id. art. 22.4.
166. EC Proposal, supra note 155, sec. C.2.
167. According to the TRIPS Agreement and the normal legal practice in the
WTO, if a party wishes to invoke a benefit, it must demonstrate that it has
fulfilled the necessary conditions. This principle is solidly stated in WTO and
GATT case law. See, e.g., WTO Report of the Appellate Body, United States Measure Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India,
WT/DS33/AB/R (Apr. 25, 1997) (Doc. #97-1773), 7-9, available at
http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple; WTO Report of
the Panel, Canada - Term of Patent Protection, WT/DS170/R (May 5, 2000)
(Doc. #00-1695), para. 6.10, available at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_
search.asp?searchmode=simple; WTO Report of the Panel, United States Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998, WT/DS176/R (Aug. 6, 2001)
(Doc #01-3806), sec. 3, available at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?
searchmode=simple.
168. EC Proposal, supra note 155. The proposal speaks of “justified opposition,” although nothing is said of who judges whether opposition is justified.
Id. para. C.2. From my point of view, TRIPS Council can play a decisive role
in the development of this function, in association with the tasks entrusted to
it in Articles 24.2 and 68.
169. Id.
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no Member will be able to reject the protection alleging that it
does not fulfill the conditions demanded in the general definition.170 Members also may not allege that the GI, although literally true as to the territory in which the goods originated,
falsely represents that the goods originated in another territory.171 Moreover, Members may not allege that the GI deals
with a generic term.172 It is possible, however, to deduce sensu
contrario that the other exceptions to the protection will continue to allowed to be demanded by any Member.173
From its inscription in the register, the GI would benefit from
unconditional protection in the markets of all Members, as it
would then be considered prima facie compatible with the definition in Article 22.1 and consequently deserving of protection.174 Nevertheless, such presumption could be refuted if use
of a GI was the object of a controversy before a national tribunal.175 The register would protect GIs of other Members, since
national jurisdictions and trademarks offices would have concise and clear information at their disposition. The list of GIs
that had been registered would be published so that all the operators might know the inscription in the register. Consequently, the GIs would benefit from the presumption of protection. In addition, the EC Proposal mandates that Members will
have to establish legal means so that the interested parties use
the registration as a presumption of GI protection.

170. See TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 22.1.
171. See id. art. 22.4.
172. See id. art. 24.6.
173. Although in accordance with Article 24.1 of TRIPS, this WTO Member
must agree to enter into negotiations aimed at increasing the protection of
individual GIs. Furthermore, the provisions of paragraphs 4–8 of Article 24
may not be used by the WTO Member to refuse to conduct negotiations or to
conclude bilateral or multilateral agreements. In the context of such negotiations, Members shall be willing to consider the continued applicability of these
provisions to individual GIs whose use was the subject of such negotiations.
See Knaak, supra note 40, at 135.
174. EC Proposal, supra note 155.
175. Id.
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176
Concerning the problem of homonymous GIs, the proposal
establishes the principle of coexistence in order to avoid deceptive practices vis-à-vis the consumer.177 Negotiations could take
place at that point between Members to avoid such fraud. Further, once any opposition procedure has been concluded, the GI
would be registered by the Secretariat and thereby benefit from
unconditional TRIPS-level protection. Finally, the EC Proposal
establishes that the registration system should take into account future developments, such as when a GI was no longer
used or a new GI had come into being.178

ii) Critical Appraisal: Why the EC Proposal Works Best
The EC Proposal is the only one that facilitates multilateral
GI protection as Article 23.4 prescribes. The principal characteristic of the EC Proposal is its concept of a full registration
system. Although voluntary, the system proposed by the EC
would provide that once a GI was registered it would bind all
WTO Members. Rights to oppose registration would counterbalance this legal obligation. It, therefore, does not create new
obligations, as any Member would have the opportunity to oppose a registration under the EC Proposal.179
But, is a system which creates legal effects at the international level really necessary to facilitate protection? There are
several reasons why it is necessary, but the most important is
that international legal effects would make GI protection easier
to implement by providing that registered GIs benefit from a
presumption of eligibility for protection.180 The system would
enable producers to reduce costs as they would have easier access to the legal means available to them to secure and enforce

176. See TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 23.3. Homonymous geographical indications entail the use of two or more identical geographical indications used to
designate the geographical origin of products stemming from different countries. The most frequent cases of homonymous geographical indications concern the names of regions which are located in different countries. An example for such a region would be an area situated along a river running through
several countries, such as the Rhine.
177. EC Proposal, supra note 155, para. D.
178. Id. para. E.
179. Id. para. C.2.
180. Id. art. 11.
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Prothe level of protection prescribed in Articles 22 and 23.
ducers would not feel compelled to seek protection of their GIs
by way of prevention in Member countries.
Occasional
free-riding of a notified GI would be discouraged because producers using GIs registered by other countries would have to
bear the burden of proof and incur litigation costs.
In case of litigation, the register would be a tool for these producers to “facilitate” the protection of their GIs by shifting the
burden of proof. This could be particularly valuable for producers in developing countries who might not otherwise have the
means to assert their rights in all markets. The notification,
examination, and opposition phases should therefore be considered an investment in the system’s viability; the costs involved
would be offset by the benefit that would be derived from effective protection.182 Without a presumption of eligibility, in most
cases it would be difficult, if not impossible, for the average
right-holder of a GI to enforce his rights under Article 23, because he would have to build a case from scratch before local
courts. In certain cases, litigants would be thousands of kilometers from home and under completely different legal systems. This inconvenience would threaten the Members’ clear
intention to provide Article 23-level protection to GIs for wines
and spirits. Under the EC Proposal, producers with a policy of
international expansion would be able to save costs when defending their names around the world.
Public administrations would have timely information that
allows them, for example, not to register trademarks containing
such GIs, as prescribed by Article 23.2.. As a result, a system
with legal effects at the international level is necessary to facilitate protection because usurpation would diminish and, in turn,
litigation and administration costs would decrease. Again, this
181. Id.
182. The representative of Switzerland stated in the TRIPS Council meeting
held on November 28, 2002, that “[t]he notification, examination and opposition phases should therefore be considered as an investment for the usefulness and viability of the system; the costs involved would be off-set by the
benefit derived from a real facilitated protection.” WTO Council for TRIPS,
Special Session, Minutes of Meeting, TN/IP/M/4 (Feb. 6, 2003) (Doc #03-0786),
para. 94, available at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode
=simple.
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means that the EC Proposal would make GI protection easier to
implement. Under the proposal, registered GIs benefit from a
presumption of eligibility for protection; moreover, piracy is discouraged. These two features benefit all parties: producers,
consumers, and administrations.183
Nevertheless, the EC Proposal is not free from criticism. Certain aspects create difficulties. In particular, the reach of the
effects of decisions adopted within the opposition procedures are
exclusively limited to the parties.184 This limitation of effects
could easily lead to a situation where a notified GI which does
not satisfy Article 22.1, or which constitutes a generic term opposed successfully by Members, would have to be protected by
non-participating Members opposing the procedure. This would
lead to the incongruity of two different categories of GIs: those
inscribed in the register to which all Members would have to
give total protection, and those whose registration would have
been rejected by some Members. Those who had not objected
would be forced to grant total protection. It is clear that this
would harm legitimate commercial interests in all markets, not
only for Members who did not oppose within the term and, for
that reason, are forced to protect the registered indication, but
also Members who carried out the opposition successfully.185
183. But see, Goebel, supra note 146, at 986 n.72 (arguing that most of the
existing multilateral systems of notification and registration, such as under
Art. 6ter of the Paris Convention, the Hague Agreement in the field of industrial designs and the Madrid Protocol in the field of trademarks, all rely ultimately on determinations under domestic law to determine eligibility and
protection). See WTO Council for TRIPS, Special Session, Revised Note by the
Secretariat, Discussion of the Establishment of a Multilateral System of Notification and Registration of Geographical Indications for Wines and Spirits:
Compilation of Issues and Points, TN/IP/W/7Rev.1 (May 23, 2003) (Doc. #032761), para. 57, available at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?search
mode=simple.
184. The EC Proposal states explicitly that “Members who have not challenged, within 18 months, the registration of an individual geographical indication under provision C.2 shall not refuse its protection on the basis of Articles 22.1, 22.4 and 24.6 of the TRIPS Agreement.” EC Proposal, supra note
155, para. D.
185. See Goldberg, supra note 157, at 117.
This result seems to violate TRIPS in two ways: (1) if a Member can
only oppose an application based on reasons stemming from the
TRIPS Agreement, then a successful opposition means the geographical indication is not protectable under TRIPS; and (2) if only the op-
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Certainly, some exceptions provided in the TRIPS Agreement
have a specific character depending on national markets. Thus,
the question of whether a GI has become a generic term under
24.6 could surface in a national market, but not necessarily in
others. But, other reasons for successful opposition have a more
general reach and, subsequently, must prevent the protection in
all markets to obtain the true objective of Article 23.4. Hence,
when a proposed GI to the register does not fulfill the criteria of
the general definition of Article 22.1, it must not be allowed to
accede to the register at all in order to avoid undermining the
credibility of the system.
In order to avoid these problems, the system must differentiate between absolute and relative reasons for opposition.186 The
absolute opposition would be based on paragraphs 1 or 4 of Article 22.187 The relative reasons for opposition would consist of
the exceptions to the protection established in paragraphs 4, 5
or 6 of Article 24.188 GIs having been opposed with a favorable
result on the basis of the relative reasons for opposition could be
registered, and Members who did not participate in the opposition procedure will be unable to deny protection. The refusal of
the protection will be justified solely by the Member who has

posing Member need not protect the geographical indication, then it
seems that the MFN Clause under Article 4 would be violated. A way
to solve this problem with the EC Proposal is: when a geographical
indication is successfully opposed, it should not be registered at all.
Id.
186. The system proposed by Hungary provides for a “multilateral possibility to challenge the registration of a notified geographical indication and that
the results of a successful challenge, where appropriate, should apply on an
erga omnes basis.” WTO Council of TRIPS, Communication from Hungary,
Incorporation of Elements Raised by Hungary in IP/C/W/234 Into the Proposal by the European Communities and their Member States on the Establishment of a Multilateral System Notification and Registration of Geographical Indications, IP/C/W/255 (May 3, 2001) (Doc #01-2271), para. 2, available at
http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple.
187. The two grounds for absolute opposition involve failure to meet the
definitional standards of Article 22, Paragraph 1. The other absolute bar is
Paragraph 4 which states, “[t]he protections under paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 shall
be applicable against a [GI] which, although literally true as to the territory,
region, or locality in which the goods originate, falsely represent to the public
that the goods originate in another territory.” TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 22.4.
188. Article 24, paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 involve previous use, use by a trademark, and genericness within a Member State, respectively. Id. art. 24.
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opposed the register with a favorable result, and this information must be entered into the register.189
189. Apart from these proposals presented by WTO Members, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are also trying to participate in these
negotiations, as is shown by the paper presented by the INTA about the multilateral system for the notification and registration of GIs, and by the International Chamber of Commerce, regarding the expansion of additional protection for products other than wines and spirits. The INTA submitted its Proposal for the system in April 2003. International Trademark Association, Establishment of a Multilateral System of Notification and the Registration of the
Geographical Indications for Wines and Spirits Pursuant to TRIPS Article
23(4), Feb. 28, 2003, available at http://www.inta.org/downloads/tap_
GIpaper.pdf. INTA recognizes that GIs need to be enforceable, without creating undue barriers to trade. “INTA is convinced that it is possible to achieve a
harmonious co-existence of protection systems for GIs and other intellectual
property rights, including trademarks….” Conflicts between these rights
should be resolved pursuant to the well-established intellectual property principles of territoriality, exclusivity, and priority. INTA believes that no means
of intellectual property protection is superior or inferior to another. INTA is
of the opinion that the facilitation of the protection of GIs through the system
should be based on the experience gained under other multilateral instruments for the protection of intellectual property rights, in particular, the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) and the Madrid System. From those two wellestablished systems INTA extracts a number of features and conditions for
the multinational protection of intellectual property rights:
The international notification/registration should be based on the existence of a national application/registration; the notification should
be facilitated through an international body; the examination of
whether the intellectual property right at issue meets the protection
requirements should be carried-out in the country where protection is
sought; third parties shall be able to challenge the application and/or
registration before the national offices and for national courts in the
country where protection is sought.
Id. at 3. Dealing with the substantive examination of GIs and with possible
third-party rights through the established and largely well-trained national
courts and administrative bodies will provide a particular advantage for
smaller and medium-sized companies. For those companies, the costs for persuading a government to take up their case to the WTO will be prohibitive.
Id. at 5. The owner of a medium-sized company
who owns a trademark registration conflicting with a GI in fifty countries would have to persuade the governments of fifty countries to
raise an objection with the WTO in order to defend the exclusivity of
his prior trademark. The costs involved in such exercise will considerably exceed the costs of filing opposition proceedings or a cancellation action before… the respective national courts.
Id. “Furthermore, in many cases the trademark owner will not succeed in
persuading a government to raise an objection on its behalf, since such an
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V. EXPANSION OF THE SYSTEM: ADDITIONAL PROTECTION FOR
PRODUCTS OTHER THAN WINES AND SPIRITS
The second battleground over GIs is the expansion of Article
190
In23 protection for products other than wines and spirits.
deed, a large group of WTO Members, especially developing
countries,191 have proposed before the TRIPS Council the elimination of existing deficiencies in the sphere of GI protection
with a view to applying the same level of protection of wines
and spirits to all other products.192 As a result of the pressure
objection may conflict with the specific government interests in the protection
of its own GIs. Id. at 6. For that reason, INTA recommends that the system
should follow a Madrid-like or PCT-like approach and include the following
key-elements: notification/registration through an international body to the
participating states, ex officio examination of protectability in the country of
protection, refusal/opposition on the basis of prior (trademark) rights, ability
to challenge the registration in the national courts. Id.
A system built on these concepts will facilitate - according to INTA
document - the protection of GIs, in the same way that the Madrid
System facilitates the protection of trademarks and the PCT facilitates the protection of patents. At the same time, it will recognize
that GIs are what they are deemed to be under TRIPS, an intellectual
property right, the importance and the value of which equals, but not
surpasses, trademarks and patents.
Id.
190. See Addor & Grazzioli, supra note 5, at 896 (affirming that, “the improved protection of geographical indications for all products on a level similar
to the one granted at present for wines and spirits, would promise trade and
investments advantages, in particular for all these developing and developed
countries which depend on exports of primary commodities”).
191. The issue of extension is of particular interest to developing countries
because of the importance of the remunerative marketing of their agricultural, handicraft and artisan production. In addition, GIs have features that
respond to the needs of indigenous and local communities and farmers. See
id. at 893–95.
192. The call for extension of additional protection for GIs to products other
than wines and spirits was confirmed in the Communication from Bulgaria,
Cyprus, Cuba, Czech Republic, the European Community and their Member
States, Georgia, Hungary, Iceland, India, Kenya, Liechtenstein, Malta, Mauritius, Pakistan, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Thailand and Turkey, see WTO Council for TRIPS, Communication from Bulgaria,
Cuba, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, the European Communities and Their
Member States, Georgia, Hungary, Iceland, India, Kenya, Liechtenstein,
Malta, Mauritius, Pakistan, Romania, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Sri
Lanka, Switzerland, Thailand and Turkey, IP/C/W/353 (June 24, 2002) (Doc.
#02-3484), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode
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exerted by developing countries, this issue ranks very high on
the negotiating agenda of the WTO.193
A. The TRIPS Agreement’s Preferential Treatment of
Wines and Spirits
Presently, TRIPS provides two levels of protection for the
same intellectual property right. Article 22’s base level of protection is limited to cases where the public is misled as to the
true geographical origin of a product or where GI use constitutes an act of unfair competition. Article 23 enhances the level
of protection for wine and spirit GIs beyond that provided for in
Article 22. The “misleading test” as applied to Article 22 is a
burdensome requirement tailored to suit laws for protection
against unfair competition or protection of consumers, but not
protection of intellectual property. In particular, the condition
that existing protection only apply to the extent needed to prevent “misleading the public” results in wide legal uncertainty.
Unlike Article 23, Article 22 does not prevent the use of GIs in
translation194 or if they are accompanied by expressions such as
“style,” “type,” “kind,” or “imitation,” thus enabling free-riding
on renowned GIs. Nor does it prevent free-riding on the efforts
and hard work employed to make a GI renowned. All such free-

=simple [hereinafter Switzerland Proposal for Extension]; see also WTO
Council for TRIPS, Proposal from Bulgaria, Cuba, the Czech Republic, Egypt,
Iceland, India, Jamaica, Kenya, Liechtenstein, Mauritius, Nigeria, Pakistan,
Slovenia, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Turkey and Venezuela, IP/C/W/247/Rev.1
(May 17, 2001) (Doc. #01-2491), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/
gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple.
193. See WTO Trade Negotiations Committee, Statement by the Chairman
of the General Council, Doc. TN/C/1 (Feb. 4, 2002) (Doc #02-0530), at sec. 3,
Agenda Item 2, available at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?
searchmode=simple. The Chairman of the General Council of the Trade Negotiations Committee proposed that the Negotiations Committee should address issues in paragraphs 18 and 19 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration
relating to TRIPS in regular meetings of the TRIPS Council on a priority basis.
194. Goebel argues that one way of dealing with this issue is to try to define
more adequately the scope of protection provided for under Article 23. Goebel,
supra note 146, at 989 (“Instead of providing general protection for ‘use in
translation’ the scope of protection should properly be defined as use in translation, if that translation is associated by the relevant consumer groups with
the geographical origin of the product.”).
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riding should be prohibited to avoid the risk of GIs becoming
generic terms.195
Differential treatment of GIs under Article 23 can be explained as a product of negotiations of the Uruguay Round. The
relevant provisions are the result of trade-offs specific to circumstances prevailing at the time of the negotiations, particularly during the Brussels Ministerial Conference in 1990.196
This was, to some extent, due to the link at that time between
negotiations on GIs and agriculture.197 Today, there are no economic or systemic reasons for protecting some GIs and not others. As the sponsors of additional protection for products other
than wines and spirits have stated, the risk of confusion between products which originate in a specific region and have
special qualities, and products which use the same denomination, but do not have these qualities is damaging to any product.198
B. Advocating for Expansion of GI Protection to Other Products
The economic and political significance of GIs grows as increasing quality awareness and requirements increase demand
for products of a specific geographical origin.199 The added value
of exported goods increases chances for legitimate goods to
reach the market, which is part of the global vision for a multilateral trading system.200 Hence, since the end of the Uruguay
Round, the awareness of the need for additional protection for
products other than wines and spirits has continuously in195. Switzerland Proposal for Extension, supra note 192, sec. III, para. B.
Illegitimate use of a geographical indication with a “délocalisant”
(i.e., so-called semi-generics) indicating the true origin or use in
translation or with expression such as “kind,” “type,” “style,” “imitation,” or the like, will be prevented for all geographical indications
alike and will help therewith prevent more geographical indications
from becoming generic, thereby gradually losing all economic value.
Id.
196. For the importance of the Brussels Ministerial Conference of 1990 on
the negotiating process and the final text of the TRIPS Agreement, see
GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS, supra note
60, at 73–74.
197. See, Understanding the WTO: Developing Countries, supra note 57.
198. Switzerland Proposal for Extension, supra note 192.
199. Id. sec. II.
200. Id.
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201
creased and spread among WTO Members. Extension of Article 23-level protection would provide an adequate level of protection to GIs for all products, facilitating product identification
by the consumer and, therefore, enhancing consumer choice.202
Extension would open new market opportunities by preventing
trade distortions.203 The benefits resulting from extension
would foster the development of local rural communities and
encourage a high-quality agricultural and industrial policy. As
is the case for products protected via trademarks, those benefiting from adequate GI protection would be in a better position to
benefit from enhanced access to third-world markets. As such,
a strong GI regime would bring economic benefits to producers
worldwide, and not only to producers in countries where the
local protection of GIs is already stronger than in the WTO.
When considering extending GI protection, it is imperative to
emphasize that the proposal presented by the sponsors of additional protection for products other than wines and spirits does
not seek to require re-appropriation of terms and indications
considered generic.204 The exceptions provisions of Article 24.6
would continue to apply to such indications.205 The goal of the
extension proposal is to prevent GIs, which are not generic,
from becoming generic. The proposal presented by these WTO
Members also concerns other disadvantages resulting from the
insufficient protection provided by Article 22, such as the burden of proof required under that provision to defend a GI
against misuse.206
The creation of comprehensive GI protection is not incompatible with the smooth future development of business activities in a country. The same problem has been satisfactorily addressed in the context of wines and spirits, as TRIPS already
provides enough flexibility, such as exceptions and transitional
periods ensuring that disruption of trade does not occur.207
Transitional periods and exceptions can accommodate the in-

201. Id.
202. Maher, supra note 12, at 1881 (noting that GIs are important tools for
consumer protection and product differentiation in the wine industry).
203. Switzerland Proposal for Extension, supra note 192.
204. Id. sec. III, para. F.
205. Id.
206. Id. sec. III, para. E.
207. Id. sec. II.4. See, e.g., TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 24.4.

File: Martin Macro 122704.doc

168

Created on: 12/27/2004 1:35 PM

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

Last Printed: 12/27/2004 1:36 PM

[Vol. 30:1

terests of producers and make re-labeling unnecessary. Therefore, extension, as such, will not affect the production and export of products.
In summary, the rationale of extension is that GIs for all
products deserve the same level of protection as that which applies currently only to wines and spirits. In order to establish
such uniform protection for all products and broaden Article
23.1 protections to other products, some WTO Members have
proposed removing the reference in Article 23.1 to wines and
spirits, and preventing the use of a GI “identifying products of
the same category” not originating in the place referred to by
it.208 This would eradicate the existing imbalance in Part II,
Section 3, thus providing the same level of effective protection
to GIs for all products.209
However, many countries, including Argentina, Australia,
Canada, Chile, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, and the United
States, have strongly opposed extension, partly because they
believe there is no evidence that protection currently available
for products other than wines and spirits is inadequate.210 They
also object because they feel that extending protections would
create unnecessary obligations, be significantly costly, and generate limited benefits, if any.211 Additionally, New Zealand, for
example, believes that an extension to the scope of goods covered by Article 23 would be premature.212 The majority of these
countries has been consistently obstinate about giving strong
protection to GIs. While these countries wish to approach negotiations over protection for GIs and expansion of TRIPS slowly,
Members that could benefit the most are ready to move full
speed ahead.

208. Switzerland Proposal for Extension, supra note 192, art. III.B.12.
209. Id. sec. II.
210. See Woranuj Maneerungsee, Protection for Silk and Rice Hits Snags,
BANGKOK POST, Nov. 21, 2002, at 3 (noting U.S. opposition to an extension of
geographical identification protection).
211. See, e.g., Meltzer, supra note 150, para. 19.
212. WTO Council for TRIPS, Communication from New Zealand, Geographical Indications and the Article 24.2 Review, IP/C/W/205 (Sept. 18, 2000)
(Doc #00-3673), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?search
mode=simple.
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VI. FUTURE PROSPECTS IN MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS
The main proposals presented thus far aimed at ensuring effective protection for GIs can be categorized as incompatible,
thus, the negotiations on these proposals in the TRIPS Council
have been stalled. The views of the different Members are divided, not only by the legal effects of the registration system for
GIs, but also by the question of the extension of GIs to products
other than wines and spirits.213
With respect to the notification and registration system for
GIs, the maximalist approach — represented by the EC Proposal — seems best suited to achieve the objective of facilitating
the protection of GIs as prescribed in Article 23.4. Nevertheless, some countries have shown their opposition to the proposal, alleging that this would demand the creation of an exceedingly complex and legally ambitious system.214 By contrast,
those in favor of the U.S.-led Proposal state that the European
system would establish new legal obligations for WTO Members215 since they could be bound to verify hundreds of different
213. As a general matter, it has been argued that developing countries may
find it in their interest to use GIs as a tool to help create and maintain both
domestic and export markets for distinctive goods originating in their territory. See Ralph S. Brown, New Wine in Old Bottles: The Protection of France's
Wine Classification System Beyond Its Borders, 12 B.U. INT'L L.J. 471 (1994).
214. Minutes of September 17, 1998 Meeting, supra note 99, at para. 48
(comments from the New Zealand representative).
215. While the European Community is proposing the creation of a register
for all foodstuffs, other nations are challenging the very blueprint for this
register. At the conclusion of the 1999 Special 301 Review, the United States
initiated a WTO dispute-settlement case against the EC based on TRIPS deficiencies in EEC Regulation 2081/92. See WTO, Request for Consultations by
the United States, European Communities – Protection of Trademarks and
Geographical Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs,
WT/DS174/1 (June 7, 1999) (Doc. #99-2282), available at http://docsonline.wto.
org/gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple. The United States argues that EEC
Regulation 2081/92’s reciprocity requirement violates the National Treatment
Principle of Article 3 of the TRIPS Agreement and does not provide sufficient
protection to pre-existing trademarks that are similar or identical to a GI and
appears to be inconsistent with the European Communities’ obligations under
TRIPS. The United States argues that the WTO rules require the EC to afford the same GI protection to non-EC states that it offers its own nationals regardless of whether the non-EC nation has similar GI standards. This could
mean that this Regulation does not provide the same treatment to other nationals and products originating outside the EC that it provides to the EC's
own nationals and products; does not accord immediately and unconditionally
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GIs and face onerous opposition procedures, which will be especially burdensome for Members with limited resources.216 Moreto the nationals and products of each WTO Member any advantage, favor,
privilege or immunity granted to the nationals and products of other WTO
Members; diminishes the legal protection for trademarks (including to prevent
the use of an identical or similar sign that is likely to); does not provide legal
means for interested parties to prevent the misleading use of a GI; does not
define a GI in a manner that is consistent with the definition provided in the
TRIPS; is not sufficiently transparent; and does not provide adequate enforcement procedures. Invoking the first step to resolving a trade dispute at
the WTO, the United States requested private consultations with the EC before deciding whether to initiate formal dispute settlement proceedings. See
WTO Request for Consultations by the United States, Addendum, European
Communities – Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications for
Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, WT/DS174/1/Add.1 (Apr. 10, 2003)
(Doc. #03-1960), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?search
mode=simple. However, these consultations failed to resolve the dispute. The
U.S.-amended complaint alleged that the EC regulation also violated the MFN
Clause of TRIPS. Fifteen WTO Members have joined the consultations: Australia, Mexico, New Zealand, Sri Lanka, India, Argentina, Hungary, Malta,
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Slovenia, Turkey, Romania and the
Slovak Republic. See, e.g., WTO, Communication from Australia, European
Communities – Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications for
Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, Request to Join Consultations,
WT/DS174/4
(Apr.
23,
2003)
(Doc
#03-2161),
available
at
http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple.
Finally, the
United. States asked the Dispute Settlement Body to establish a panel. WTO,
Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the United States, European
Communities – Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications for
Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, WT/DS174/20 (Aug. 19, 2003) (Doc. #034330), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode=
simple. Many other Members also requested to join these consultations. See,
e.g. WTO, Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the Australia, European Communities – Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications
for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, WT/DS290/18 (Aug. 19, 2003) (Doc.
#03-4315), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?search
mode=simple). In addition to these concerns, the United States raises objections to wine import certification practices instituted by the EC, as well as
labeling requirements specifically relating to an EC attempt to phase out the
usage of semi-generic names (i.e., Burgundy, Champagne, Chablis) on non-EC
wines and other “traditional expressions” (primarily geographical indications)
used to describe wine. See generally USTR National Trade Estimate Report on
Foreign Trade Barriers, available at http://www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/
Reports_Publications/2004/2004_National_Trade_Estimate/2004_NTE_Report
/Section_Index.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2004); ROBERT M. MACLEAN &
BETTINA VOLPI, EU TRADE BARRIER REGULATION: TACKLING UNFAIR FOREIGN
TRADE PRACTICES (2000).
216. Minutes of September 17, 1998 Meeting, supra note 99, para. 41.
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over, the creation of a system with these characteristics would
consume a great amount of resources. 217 These countries opposing the maximalist approach have also insisted that such an
approach is incompatible with means used by many WTO
Members to protect GIs, such as certification marks, unfair
competition law, and common law.
Whether the system should be expanded to establish additional protection for products other than wines and spirits is
also hotly contested. A large group of Members, predominantly
from developing countries,218 supports expansion because the
legal system currently provided under TRIPS, including its exceptions, is insufficient for providing strong protection for GIs.
These Members believe that additional protection granted for
some GIs constitutes arbitrary discrimination against all other
products. Conversely, there is another group of countries which
believes that additional protection granted only for certain
products in the TRIPS Agreement reflects the balance reached
in multilateral trade negotiations, and should not, thus, be altered at this stage.219
217. Id.; see also id. para. 45 (declarations of the Australian representative).
Likewise, in the meeting held on March 21, 2000, the Australian representative affirmed that it had not been considered necessary under the TRIPS
Agreement to override or preempt national decision-making processes on
trademark or patent protection to create default global protection for individual intellectual property rights, even for well-known marks which were
viewed by some as having global reach. GIs should not become default global
rights without reference to the specific commercial conditions and legal situations in the jurisdiction of each Member concerned. WTO, Council for TRIPS,
Minutes of Meeting, IP/C/M/26 (May 24, 2000) (Doc. #00-2113), available at
http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple.
218. The call for extension of additional protection for GIs to products other
than wines and spirits is being demanded by the following developing countries: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Cuba, Czech Republic, Georgia, Hungary, Iceland,
India, Kenya, Liechtenstein, Malta, Mauritius, Pakistan, Romania, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Turkey.
219. Opponents, such as the United States, Canada, Argentina, El Salvador,
and the Philippines, say that while an international register protecting all
foodstuffs may sound appealing, it raises many potential problems. First,
they argue that an international register is not necessary because Article 22
already provides sufficient protection for all foodstuffs and many countries
have simply not resorted to using Article 22 TRIPS in protecting their products. Second, while the EC and other advocates claim that an international
register would benefit all WTO Members (especially developing countries),
opponents counter that developing countries have few domestic GIs and
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220
To date, the qualities that best describe the negotiations are
a lack of dynamism and an unwillingness of some Members to
advance questions established in the Built-In Agenda.221 This

would, instead, find themselves having to provide extensive legal protection
for a large number of foreign GIs. Furthermore, opponents argue that the EC
Proposal will not offer protection to nearly as many products as it has stated
because many of these product names have become generic terms (which do
not receive GI protection under the TRIPS). Third, opponents claim that a
global register would impose major costs on producers and consumers. An
international register, they say, will force companies to analyze every export
market to ensure that their product names are not illegally using a GI protected under that registry. A business using such a GI could be forced to rename and re-package its goods, the costs of which might be passed along to
consumers in the form of higher prices. Finally, they point out that the EC
has had numerous problems with its own domestic GI regulation, and suggest
that the WTO first create an international register for wines, evaluate its
effectiveness, and then discuss the possibility of creating an international
register for all other foodstuffs.
220. The Cancun Ministerial Conference ended on September 14, 2003 with
no results, after the Chairperson Luis Ernesto Derbez concluded that, despite
considerable movement in consultations, Members remained entrenched, particularly on the “Singapore” issues. See WTO Ministerial Conference, Fifth
Session, Ministerial Statement, WT/MIN(03)/20 (Sept. 23, 2003) (Doc. #035034), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode
=simple. About the failure of the recent trade talks in Cancun, see Jeffrey
Schott, Unlocking the Benefits of World Trade, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 1, 2003,
at 65. Notwithstanding this setback, the Ministers reaffirmed all Doha Declarations and Decisions and recommitted themselves to working to implement
them fully and faithfully. See id.; J.M. Paugam, Après Cancun: La double
crise de l’OMC, 477 REVUE DU MARCHÉ COMMUN ET DE L’UNION EUROPÉENNE
230–34 (2004).
221. The Council for TRIPS met on April 7, 2004, for its first special (negotiating) session since the Cancun Ministerial Conference, to continue negotiations on a multilateral register for GIs for wines and spirits. Discussions focused on the key outstanding issues in the negotiating mandate provided in
the TRIPS Agreement, with fundamental divisions remaining among Members. Discussions at the meeting broadly fell under the two key outstanding
issues related to “participation” and “legal effect.” The meeting made virtually no headway, with one observer noting that in contrast to other negotiating areas, such as agriculture, the TRIPS discussions had not even entered
the "listening" phase. TRIPS Council Scrutinises GI Negotiating Mandate, 8
BRIDGES WEEKLY TRADE NEWS DIGEST 6 (2004), available at http://
www.ictsd.com/weekly/04-04-22/BRIDGESWeekly8-14.pdf (last visited Oct.
20, 2004). The supporters of the joint proposal believe that the European
approach, which would allow Members to challenge proposed registrations
and would require registered terms to be protected in all WTO Member countries, would amount to “TRIPS-plus” by increasing the obligations under the
TRIPS. In response, the new grouping called the “Friends of Geographical

File: Martin Macro 122704.doc

2004]

Created on: 12/27/2004 1:35 PM

Last Printed: 12/27/2004 1:36 PM

GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS

173

paralysis is made more evident when these negotiations are
compared with those of the Uruguay Round, during which there
was considerable pressure.222 Currently, no pressure exists, nor
are there the commitments to negotiate that existed during the
Uruguay Round where certain chapters of the final agreement
could be combined with others.223
Indications,” which included more than 50 Members, noted that such a database would be unreliable – and consequently not “facilitate” protection – if
Members were unable to challenge a term internationally. They believe that
allowing Members to opt out of the system would make it “plurilateral” rather
than “multilateral,” as required by the mandate. Rather than increasing obligations, they stated that the system would simply facilitate Members’ compliance with existing obligations under the Agreement. Hungary also pointed
out that, in any case, even the “joint proposal’ could be regarded as "TRIPSplus" as it would require a notification that does not currently exits. See id.
222. Coerper has stated that “There is no time schedule for such “negotiations,” nor does it appear that any establishment of such a system need be
mandatory – it could be merely informative – as regards to the wine appellations notified and registered by the various members. See Milo G. Coerper,
Certification Marks as a Means of Protecting Wine Appellations in the United
States, IPL NEWSLETTER (A.B.A. Sec. Intell. Prop. L.), Spring 1998, at 24.
223. Sergio Escudero, TRIPs: el alcance de la protección de las indicaciones
geográficas, in TEMAS DE DERECHO INDUSTRIAL Y DE LA COMPETENCIA:
PROPIEDAD INTELECTUAL EN EL GATT 163 (Carlos Correa ed., 1997) (highlighting that for some countries, the United States, among others, it is inopportune
to conduct the negotiation now. For this author, nothing guarantees the register will be created because there is not a specified period to achieve this goal.).
See also Coerper, Certification Marks as a Means of Protecting Wine Appellations in the United States, supra note 222, at 25 (emphasizing the absence of
any precise timetable to carry out the negotiations as the main problem the
creation of the multilateral register). Nevertheless, it can be clearly deduced
that Article 24.1 TRIPS is a commitment for Members to enter into negotiations to increase the protection of certain GIs. This pactum de negociando
seems, in any case, to include the duty for any WTO Member to negotiate in
good faith and avoid illegal delays. See North Sea Continental Shelf Cases
(FRG v. Den.; FRG v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 46 (Feb. 20) (“The parties to a negotiation] are under an obligation so to conduct themselves that the negotiations are meaningful, which will not be the case when either of them insists
upon its own position without contemplating any modification of it.”). Another scholar states:
The idea that states are under an obligation to negotiate, at least in
those situations where the extent of their rights can only be defined
by reference to the rights of other states, is both the pragmatic and
logical consequence of the interdependence of states in the modern
world and of the general recognition, by states, practitioners, and
students, of international relations of that interdependence.
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Nevertheless, the future is certainly not discouraging. In fact,
the apparent paralysis that has surrounded the debate in the
TRIPS Council could change in the short run. To begin, the
Doha Ministerial Declaration placed the protection of GIs on
the agenda224 of WTO trade negotiations,225 fixing a precise
schedule of negotiation that impels creation of the registration
system for GIs and expansion of protection for products other
than wine and spirits.226 This mandate provides a definitive
impetus to the negotiations that, up to the present day, have
been suspended by Members reluctant to accord protection to
this legal category. According to the Declaration, the negotiations must conclude no later than January 1, 2005,227 and will
be supervised by a Trade Negotiations Committee which will
act under the authority of the General Council.228 Furthermore,
these statements have been reaffirmed by the General Council
of the WTO in the Decision about the Doha Work Programme
adopted on August 1, 2004.229
Martin A. Rogoff, The Obligation to Negotiate in International Law: Rules and
Realities, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 141, 183 (1994).
224. See Abbott, supra note 23.
225. Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 96.
226. Id. para. 18.
With a view to completing the work started in the Council for TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights … on the implementation of Article 23.4, we agree to negotiate the establishment of a
multilateral system of notification and registration of geographical
indications for wines and spirits by the Fifth Session of the Ministerial Conference. We note that issues related to the extension of the
protection of GIs provided for in Article 23 to products other than
wines and spirits will be addressed in the Council for TRIPS pursuant to paragraph 12 of this Declaration.
Id.
227. Id. para. 45.
228. Id. para. 46 (“Issues related to the extension of the protection of GIs
provided for in Article 23 to products other than wines and spirits will be addressed in the Council for TRIPS, which shall report to the Trade Negotiations Committee, established under paragraph 46 of this Declaration, by the
end of 2002 for appropriate action.”).
229. See Doha Work Programme, Decision Adopted by the General Council
on 1 August 2004, WT/L/579 (Aug. 2, 2004) (Doc #04-3297), at 2, available at
http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple.
The (General) Council requests the Director-General to continue with
his consultative process on all outstanding implementation issues
under paragraph 12(b) of the Doha Ministerial Declaration, including
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A. The Importance of GI Protection to Developing Countries May
Serve as a Catalyst to Further Negotiation
It is apparent from recent debates that developing countries
are becoming aware of the importance of GIs as instruments
that contribute to the development of their economies.230 Although these countries might have shown greater interest in
this subject during the Uruguay Round,231 lamentably, they did
not understand the importance of an effective system of GI protection to defending their cultural, technical and traditional

on issues related to the extension of the protection of geographical indications provided for in Article 23 of the TRIPS Agreement to products other than wines and spirits, if need be by appointing Chairpersons of concerned WTO bodies as his Friends and/or by holding dedicated consultations. The Director-General shall report to the TNC
(Trade Negotiations Committee) and the General Council no later
than May 2005. The Council shall review progress and take any appropriate action no later than July 2005.
Id.
230. Compare Heald, supra note 11, at 656 with E. Durán & C. Michalopoulos, Intellectual Property Rights and Developing Countries in the WTO Millennium Round, 2 J. OF WORLD INTELL. PROP. 860 (1999). Heald asserts that increasing protection of GIs will stimulate the exports from developing countries
in agricultural and crafts products under the identification of an exclusive GI.
In this respect, he mentions the success that is experienced in the U.S. market
with Chilean wine. On the other hand, Durán and Michalopoulos assert that
there is no evidence that all developing countries will benefit from an extended protection of GIs because this will depend on whether the country is a
producer of the merchandise whose GI is protected.
231. During the Uruguay Round, Switzerland showed great interest in
protecting GIs for crafts products such as “Swiss Made” for clocks or the image
of the Matterhorn for chocolates, see Communication from Switzerland,
NG11/W/73, in Negotiating Group on TRIPS, Meeting of Negotiating Group of
May 14–16, 1990, Note by the Secretariat, MTN.GNG/NG11/21 (June 22, 1990)
(Doc. #90-0360), para. 41, available at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.
asp?searchmode=simple. Some developing countries also rejected limiting the
additional protection to wines and spirits, wanted the protection system to
cover products of interest to their economies such as coffee, tea or tobacco.
See, e.g., WTO, Note by the Secretariat, Meeting of the Negotiating Group,
MTN.GNG/NG11/28 (Nov. 29, 1990) (Doc. #90-0713), available at http://
docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple. Unfortunately, however, most of these countries did not understand the importance that the system could have in defending its cultural, technical and traditional patrimony,
and let the opportunity go. Because of that, these countries will have to make
concessions to take up such negotiations again at the present time.

File: Martin Macro 122704.doc

176

Created on: 12/27/2004 1:35 PM

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

Last Printed: 12/27/2004 1:36 PM

[Vol. 30:1

232
As a result, these countries now will likely be
patrimonies.
forced to make concessions in order to begin the negotiations
again. Even so, pressure exerted by these countries to establish
the registration system for GIs and for extension can certainly
advance the negotiations.

B. Geographical Indications and Traditional Knowledge
Another factor which could influence the negotiations on the
improvement of GI protection is the pressure exerted by some
developing countries to establish a mechanism for protection of
traditional knowledge within the framework of intellectual
property.233 These Members place great value in the contribution to development objectives that protection of this knowledge
can make.234 The use of GIs for products of indigenous and local
232. See generally Downes, supra note 156, at 268–73 (arguing that intellectual property rights hurt the traditional economies of developing countries,
but that GIs may be an intellectual property right more advantageous to their
developing economies).
233. In a Communication from Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and
Peru, these countries define traditional knowledge as:
Innovations, creations and cultural expressions generated or preserved by its present possessors, who may be defined and identified
as individuals or whole communities, natural or legal persons, who
are holders of rights. The economic, commercial and cultural value of
this traditional knowledge for its possessors warrants and justifies a
legitimate interest that this knowledge be recognized as subject matter of intellectual property. This expectation on the part of those concerned that their traditional knowledge should be given legal recognition has found expression in an increasing number of national, regional and international forums, and is quite as legitimate as the expectations which in the past justified the recognition of the new subjects of intellectual property that were mentioned above by way of example.
WTO Council for TRIPS, Review of the Provisions of Article 27.3(b), Proposal
on Protection of the Intellectual Property Rights Relating to the Traditional
Knowledge of Local and Indigenous Communities, IP/C/W/165 (Nov. 3, 1999)
(Doc. #99-4753), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?search
mode=simple.
234. Apart from development objectives, WTO Members have alleged some
other reasons to remedy these problems about the protection of traditional
knowledge. These are, among others, a common economic interest, in the
sense that traditional knowledge is a valuable global resource and, hence,
international efforts to secure its protection should be actively supported. See,
e.g., WTO Council for TRIPS, Minutes of Meeting, IP/C/M/32 (Aug. 23, 2001)
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(Doc. #01-4090), paras. 134, 136, available at http://docsonline.wto.org/
gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple (comments by Indonesian and Venezuelan representatives, respectively). More specifically, it has been argued that
traditional knowledge has the potential of being translated into commercial
benefits by providing leads for the development of useful products and processes, in particular in the pharmaceutical and agricultural sectors, saving
time and cost for the biotechnology industry. WTO Council for TRIPS, Minutes of Meeting, IP/C/M/28 (Nov. 23, 2000) (Doc. #00-5002), para. 136, available at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple (comments by the Brazilian representative) [hereinafter Minutes of Sept. 21–22,
2000 Meeting]; WTO Committee on Trade and Environment, Council of
TRIPS, Submission by India, Protection of Biodiversity and Traditional
Knowledge – The Indian Experience, IP/C/W/198 (July 14, 2000) (Doc #002889), available at http://www.docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?search
mode=simple. For these reasons, it is in the common interest of mankind to
provide conditions that would be favorable to the preservation of traditional
knowledge and the continuing vitality of the peoples and communities which
generate and develop it. See WTO Council for TRIPS, Minutes of Meeting,
IP/C/M/30 (June.1, 2001) (Doc. #01-2746), paras. 153, 184, available at
http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple (comments by
Venezuelan and Ecuador representatives, respectively). Other reasons are
based on equity: given the important economic value of traditional knowledge,
the holders of traditional knowledge should share in the economic benefits
derived from that knowledge. WTO Council for TRIPS, Communication from
Bolivia, Columbia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Peru, Review of the Provisions of
Article 27.3(b), Proposal on Protection of the Intellectual Property Rights Relating to the Traditional Knowledge of Local and Indigenous Communities,
IP/C/W/165 (Nov. 3, 1999) (Doc #99-4753), available at http://docson
line.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple. Given that TRIPS requires
countries with traditional and indigenous communities to provide intellectual
property protection for a broad range of subject matters, including new ones
such as plant varieties, biological materials, layout designs and computer
software, it is only equitable that traditional knowledge should be given legal
recognition. Id.; WTO Council for TRIPS, Communication from Cuba, Honduras, Paraguay and Venezuela, Review of Implementation of the Agreement
under Article 71.1, Proposal on Protection of the Intellectual Property Rights of
the Traditional Knowledge of Local and Indigenous Communities, IP/C/W/166
(Nov. 5, 1999) (Doc. #99-4791), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_
search.asp?searchmode=simple. These countries also have raised an argument for food security, pointing out that local farming communities have over
the years developed knowledge systems for the conservation and sustainable
use of biological diversity, including through the selection and breeding of
plant varieties. The well-established practices of saving, sharing and replanting seeds sustain these communities and ensure their food security. See, e.g.,
Minutes of Sept. 21–22, 2000 Meeting, supra note 234, at para. 142 (comments
by the Kenya representative); WTO Council for TRIPS, Communication from
Mauritius on behalf of the African Group, Review of the Provisions of Article
27.3(b),
IP/C/W/206 (Sept. 20, 2000) (Doc #00-3760), available at
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235
communities’ traditional knowledge could be valuable tools for
such communities seeking to gain economic benefits from their
traditional knowledge or to prevent its objectionable commercial
use by outsiders.236 GIs respond to certain indigenous concerns
more effectively than do other intellectual property rights.237 In
particular, rights to control GIs can be maintained in perpetuity; they do not confer a monopoly right over the use of certain

http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple. Finally, environmental protection is suggested as a reason to use GIs to protect traditional
knowledge of indigenous peoples and local communities because traditional
knowledge is central to their ability to operate in an environmentally sustainable way and to conserve genetic and other natural resources. Protection of
traditional knowledge is therefore, according to these countries, closely linked
to the protection of the environment. See WTO Council for TRIPS, Minutes of
Meeting, IP/C/M/30 (June.1, 2001) (Doc. #01-2746), para. 184, available at
http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple (comments Ecuador representatives).
235. See Daniel J. Gervais, The Internationalization of Intellectual Property:
New Challenges from the Very Old and the Very New, 12 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 929, 960 (2002) (noting that the example of GIs show
that, in certain cases, rights can be granted to “representatives” of a group or
a community); WIPO, Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property
and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore, Second Session,
Survey on Existing Forms of Intellectual Property Protection for Traditional
Knowledge - Preliminary Analysis and Conclusions, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/2/9
(Dec. 3, 2001) (stating that GIs could be used to afford adequate legal protection of traditional knowledge, including indigenous designs, and various expressions of folklore), available at http://www.wipo.int/meetings/en/doc_details
.jsp?doc_id=1994.
236. To date, the debate on intellectual property rights and biodiversity has
focused on patents and on plant breeders’ rights. Downes, supra note 156, at
269. However, the potential value of GIs warrants greater attention. See,
e.g., GRAHAM DUTFIELD, CAN THE TRIPS AGREEMENT PROTECT BIOLOGICAL AND
CULTURAL DIVERSITY? 20–23 (African Centre for Technology Studies, Biopolicy
International Series No. 19, 1997).
237. Survey of Existing Forms of Intellectual Property Protection for Traditional Knowledge, supra note 235. In the WTO, the view has been expressed
that under certain circumstances GIs could be a particularly important way of
protecting traditional knowledge. For example, the European Community has
stated that in the context of traditional knowledge, geographical indications
could play a complementary role in protecting traditional products under certain circumstances. See WTO Council for TRIPS, Minutes of Meeting,
IP/C/M/32 (Aug. 23, 2001) (Doc. #01-4090), para. 136 (comments by Venezuelan representatives), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?
searchmode=simple.
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information, but simply limit the class of people who may use a
specific symbol.238
The concession of patents or other intellectual property rights
to people other than populations where the traditional knowledge originated has preoccupied more and more countries.239
They are just beginning to demand the establishment of international measures of protection. Considering that most of these
products are made following traditional methods which enjoy a
quality, reputation, or other characteristic that can be attributed to their geographical origin, these products could benefit
from GI protection; such protection could, at least, play a complementary role in their protection.240 It would be worthwhile to
explore the role that GIs could play in promoting the goals of
the Convention on Biological Diversity,241 which recognizes the
existence of defined geographical areas that require regulation

238. See Downes, supra note 156, at 271 (noting that GIs are designed to
reward goodwill and reputation created or built up by a group of producers
over many years and in some cases over centuries).
239. The Basmati case is a good example of granting a patent to people
other than the populations that originated the knowledge. Basmati is a variety of rice from the Punjab provinces of India and Pakistan. The rice is a slender, aromatic long grain variety that originated in this region and is a major
export crop for both countries. Annual basmati exports are worth about $300
million, and represent the livelihood of thousands of farmers. The “Battle for
Basmati” started in 1997 when the U.S. rice breeding firm RiceTec Inc. was
awarded a patent (US5663484) relating to plants and seeds, seeking a monopoly on various rice lines, including some having characteristics similar to
Basmati lines. Concerned about the potential effect on exports, India requested a re-examination of this patent in 2000. The patentee, in response to this
request, withdrew a number of claims including those covering basmati type
lines. Further claims were also withdrawn following concerns raised by the
USPTO. The dispute has, however, moved on from the patent to the misuse of
the name “Basmati.” In some countries the term “Basmati” can be applied
only to the long grain aromatic rice grown in India and Pakistan, while in
others it is considered generic. For additional information on this case, see
JAYASHREE WATAL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WTO AND
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 272–73 (2001).
240. GIs are especially suitable for use by indigenous and local communities
since they are based upon collective traditions and a collective decisionmaking process, protect and reward traditions while allowing evolution, emphasize the relationships between human cultures and their local land and
environment, are not freely transferable from one owner to another, and can
be maintained as long as the collective tradition is maintained.
241. Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818.
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to aid in conservation. The original products of these areas
could be classified as GIs if the producers decide to link their
collective norms and connected traditional knowledge to the
conservation.243 The creation of GIs could bring economic rewards to communities seeking to market products based upon
sustainable, traditional production practices.
Notable in this respect are observations of WIPO’s intergovernmental committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge, and Folklore that some forms
of intellectual property rights cover the content of knowledge,
others a specific expression, and others a distinctive sign or

242. One example of indigenous peoples’ use of identification of origin as a
tool to protect cultural forms and their use comes from the southwestern region of the United States. There, artisans of several Native American tribes
earn as much as $800 million annually from commercial sales of arts and
crafts. For instance, the distinctive styles of Pueblo pottery, silver jewelry,
and other items such as drums are well known. Styles and designs are considered a cultural heritage. In Zuni, a design may be the property of a certain
family and no person outside that family has the right to use it. These indigenous communities were concerned that non-indigenous producers were
using non-traditional methods to produce similar products that they passed
off as indigenous traditional goods. In response, the state of New Mexico enacted the Indian Arts and Crafts Protection Law. The law places a duty on
retailers of native arts and crafts to investigate whether goods are produced
by indigenous persons by hand using natural materials. Only if a good passes
this test can it be labeled "an authentic, Indian, hand-made piece." Controversy continues because the law does not address whether goods are produced
by traditional methods. Although this example is unrelated to biodiversity, it
offers significant lessons for indigenous control of traditional knowledge. See
Sandra Lee Pinel & Michael J. Evans, Tribal Sovereignty and the Control of
Knowledge, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS FOR INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, A
SOURCEBOOK 41, 44–48 (Tom Greaves ed., 1994). Through similar mechanisms, there may be opportunities to gain benefits from products of biological
resources produced through traditional methods or based on traditional
knowledge. See generally DAVID R. DOWNES & SARAH A. LAIRD, INNOVATIVE
MECHANISMS FOR SHARING BENEFITS OF BIODIVERSITY AND RELATED
KNOWLEDGE: CASE STUDIES ON GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS AND TRADEMARKS
(UNCTAD Biotrade Initiative, The Center for International and Environmental Law ed., 1999), available at http://www.ciel.org/Publications/
pubbaw.html (last visited Aug. 16, 2004).
243. DOWNES & LAIRD, supra note 242, at 10 (“[M]ore than other major types
of intellectual property, geographical indications have features that respond to
norms for use and management of bioresources and traditional knowledge
that are characteristic of the culture of many indigenous and local economies.”).
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244
Thus, the possibility of a product being protected by
symbol.
these complementary, though overlapping, instruments of intellectual property is very real. By way of example, consider
handicrafts: their technical content may be protected as a technical idea, while GIs could protect their cultural value. One
important finding of the Committee’s “Review of Existing Intellectual Property Protection of Traditional Knowledge” was that
while many countries considered few intellectual property instruments suitable for protecting traditional knowledge, some
looked favorably upon GIs.245

VII. CONCLUSION
What is the best way to protect, at an international level, the
names of well-known products, such as Rioja wine or Idaho Potatoes, which have reputations known by consumers around the
world? Do current international rules provide sufficient safeguards, or should governments implement another system of
more effective protection? These are the questions that need to
be solved by WTO Members within the scope of the Built-In
Agenda of the TRIPS Agreement.
The analysis of the TRIPS Agreement’s provisions emphasizes that it offers legal instruments for the protection of future
GIs while also protecting the illegal use of GIs already in use
before the TRIPS Agreement went into effect.246 Although these
244. See WIPO, Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and
Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore, Fifth Session, Overview of Activities and Outcomes of the Intergovernmental Committee,
WIPO/GRTKF/IC/5/12 (Apr. 3, 2003), available at http://www.wipo.int/docu
ments/en/meetings/2003/igc/pdf/grtkf_ic_5_12.pdf.
245. See WIPO, Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and
Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore, Third Session, Review of Existing Intellectual Property Protection of Traditional Knowledge,
WIPO/GRTKF/IC/3/7 (May 6, 2002), available at http://www.wipo.int/docum
ents/en/meetings/2002/igc/pdf/grtkfic3_7.pdf.
246. It could be said that the “sins of the past,” the expression so often used
to talk about the first legislative developments relative to GI protection, still
have not been purified. This expression has often been used to describe the
incapacity of the first international legislative developments to prevent GIs
which had properly functioned to indicate that a product came from a certain
place, but were later transformed in another country into a generic designation of a type of product. This expression is mentioned often by scholars. See,
e.g., GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS, supra
note 60, at 203; Albrecht Krieger, La revision de l’Arrangement de Lisbonne
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provisions undoubtedly represent a considerable improvement
in international protection with respect to that which existed
under WIPO, TRIPS did not create a complete system for the
international protection of GIs. Quite the contrary, these provisions continue generating considerable legal uncertainty. This
is also true with regard to the existing imbalance between protection levels, leading to an additional level of GI protection for
wines and spirits, as compared to other products.
For these reasons, the work on TRIPS is far from finished
and the debate between new and old world countries continues
to be divisive in the furtherance of TRIPS’ goal of protecting
intellectual property and global economic interests. By virtue of
the program incorporated into the text of the Agreement, the
provisions relative to the protection of GIs do not constitute a
body of static norms; thus, the Agreement must evolve towards
a more effective model of protection.
However, until now, debates in the TRIPS Council have been
deadlocked. Different Members are divided over the nature,
reach, effects, and coverage of the registration system for GIs.
With respect to the notification and registration system for GIs,
the minimalist approach presents the great disadvantage of
limiting itself to creating a simple database without consistent
legal effects. This approach is not of a multilateral character
and does not help facilitate WTO protection for GIs. The proposal is silent on the need for elements of proof or an opposition
procedure — elements indispensable to a future multilateral
register. Therefore, this system risks creating more confusion
than clarity about which products should be given Article 23level protection.
The maximalist approach, as represented in the EC Proposal,
is better suited to achieve the objective of facilitating the protection of GIs as prescribed in Article 23.4. The system proposed would be truly multilateral,as mandated in Article 23.4,
ecause it would have legal effects on all Members. It would
thus facilitate protection already available under the TRIPS

concernant la protection des appellations d’origine, 9 LA PROPRIÉTÉ INDUSTRIELLE
399, 406 (1974) (Krieger cites to the term “péchés du passé” (“sins of the past”)
but attributes the expression to Moser v. Filseck); Knaak, supra note 40,at 116;
Dawson, supra note 147, at 590 (“this must be seen as a bargaining position,
not a crime and still less a sin.).
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Agreement and would, therefore, favor legitimate users of GIs,
consumers, and administrations alike. It would also guarantee
legal certainty as one of the key elements of the multilateral
system. From my point of view, it is clear that only a meaningful and truly multilateral system could fulfill the mandate that
had been contained in the Built-In Agenda of TRIPS. Nevertheless, some countries have shown their opposition to the latter
proposal by alleging that this would demand creation of an
overly complex system.
Opinions are also divided with respect to the extension of GI
protection provided under Article 23 to products other than
wines and spirits. For some countries, the legal system provided under the TRIPS Agreement is insufficient. Moreover,
additional protection granted for wines and spirits constitutes
arbitrary discrimination against all other products. But, for
another group of countries, the additional protection granted
only for certain types of products reflects the balance reached in
the multilateral trade negotiations.
Nevertheless, the apparent paralysis that has surrounded the
debate in the TRIPS Council could change soon. GIs are on the
agenda of WTO trade negotiations, which establishes a precise
negotiating schedule for the creation of the registration system
and the expansion of additional protection for products other
than wine and spirits, assuming that the necessary consensus is
reached. This has been recently reaffirmed by the General
Council of the WTO.
In addition, when approaching the negotiations of the BuiltIn Agenda, the TRIPS Council must consider the repercussions
from the perspective of commerce and development in developing countries. The subject of GIs is of particular interest to developing countries because of the importance to those countries
of the remunerative marketing of their agricultural production.
Additionally, the assistance of GI protection to traditional
knowledge would be vital. Undoubtedly, expansion of the full
scope of the TRIPS GI regime is an effective demonstration of
the relevance of the Agreement to their economic circumstances. Resistance to this extension may communicate an unfortunate message to those countries about the political real-
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politik of the international intellectual property rights regime.
Therefore, WTO members should accept their responsibility to
provide greater protection for GIs. By doing so, they will assist
in ensuring that TRIPS remains an effective multinational
treaty by setting an international example for compliance.

247. See Michel Blakeney, Proposals for the International Regulations of
Geographical Indications, 4 J. OF WORLD INTELL. PROP. 629, 652 (2001).

